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Abstract: 
As the drive towards universal coverage is gaining momentum globally, the need for 
assessing levels of financial health protection in countries, particularly in the developing 
world, has increasingly become important. Health financing system is among the key 
elements to be strengthened if countries are to achieve the aspirational goal of universal 
coverage, which includes financial health protection. The performance of Swaziland’s 
health financing system, in terms of ensuring financial health protection, is not clearly 
understood. This study assesses financial catastrophe and impoverishment from out-of-
pocket payments, and the associated factors that predict them in Swaziland. 
Catastrophic health expenditure disrupts households’ welfare and consequently pushes 
households into poverty. The Swaziland Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(SHIES) for 2009/2010 was used for the analyses. Financial catastrophe was assessed 
using a variable threshold. Impoverishment was assessed using both a national poverty 
line and the $1.25/day international poverty line. Logistic regression models were used 
to assess factors that predict household vulnerability to financial catastrophe and 
impoverishment. It emerged that about 9.6 per cent of Swazi households experienced 
financial catastrophe, while about 1.1 per cent were pushed below the poverty line as a 
result of out-of-pocket payments. Factors associated with households’ vulnerability 
include: education of the household-head, household size, location, age and the 
household socio-economic status. The study findings indicate that financial health 
protection is not adequate in Swaziland. Thus, there is a need for concerted efforts 
toward protecting households from incurring financial catastrophe and impoverishment 
due to out-of-pocket payments. This will involve the institution of exemptions for 
vulnerable groups, and the use of financing mechanisms that do not place undue 
hardships on the poor and vulnerable.  
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1.1 Introduction 
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has defined Universal Health Coverage (UHC) 
as ensuring that all people obtain the health services they need, which should be of good 
quality without suffering financial hardship when paying for them (WHO, 2010). This 
implies that individuals should not be denied access to health care services because of 
inability to pay or risk impoverishment by using health care. In essence, UHC covers two 
priorities, that is, access to health and guaranteed financial protection. The support for 
UHC has since gained momentum globally, such that it has become a major priority for 
organization such as, the WHO and the World Bank. It has also been proposed as the 
main framework for health targets in the sustainable development agenda post 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and as better means to foster healthy lives 
(Brearly, Marten & O’Connell, 2013). Again, UHC is the most feasible approach for 
countries if they were to realise the human right to health, including low income countries 
(WHO, 2010). However, without a well-functioning health financing system the latter can 
only be achieved for a small minority of the populations (WHO, 2010). It is the health 
financing system that determines whether people can have access to use health services 
without experiencing exorbitant out-of-pocket health payments and risking 
impoverishment. Thus, it goes without debate that health financing is an important 
element of wider efforts to foster social protection in health (Brearly, Marten & O’Connell, 
2013; WHO, 2010). 
 
Health system financing could comprise of collections from direct out-of-pocket 
payments (such as co-payments and user fees at the point of service), tax revenue and 
prepayment mechanisms such as health insurance (McIntyre, 2007). However, evidence 
has shown that out-of-pocket payment is the worst form of health financing, and it is 
associated with catastrophic health expenditures and household impoverishments 
(WHO, 2010). Catastrophic expenditure is defined as health care payment levels that 
force households to reduce spending on other basic necessities (e.g., food, education 
and shelter), including the sale of productive assets1 or incurring high levels of debts. 
Such payments may impoverish households (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). 
Impoverishment resulting from out-of-pocket payments is when an individual or a 
                                                          
 
 
1 A productive asset is an income generating property to the household, e.g., land. 
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household is pushed below the poverty line2 as a consequence of such payments 
(McIntyre, 2007). It is estimated that about 150 million people globally suffer catastrophic 
health expenditures while about 100 million are pushed below the poverty line as a result 
of out-of-pocket payments (WHO, 2010). 
 
Similar evidence has been observed in various studies conducted both in developing 
and developed countries (Xu et al., 2007; van Doorslaer et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2003). In 
view of the evidence, the World Health Organization is calling on countries to move away 
from relying on direct out-of-pocket payments, and to adopt pre-payment mechanisms 
particularly mandatory mechanisms which have been found to offer financial risk 
protection and sufficient risk pooling3 (WHO, 2010). However, despite the apparent 
detrimental effects of out-of-pocket payments observed in various studies, evidence 
continues to show that a substantial number of countries still rely on out-of-pocket 
payments as a dominant health financing mechanism, particularly in developing 
countries (McIntyre et al., 2006). 
 
Swaziland is a lower-middle income country with a population of approximately 1 million 
people according to the 2012 projection (Central Statistics Office [CSO], 2015). Like most 
other countries in Southern Africa, Swaziland’s health financing system consists of tax 
payments (estimated to constitute 18% of General Government Expenditure on health 
as a percentage of the total expenditure on health), for profit private health insurances 
(19%), out-of-pocket payments (11%) and donors (22%) (WHO, 2015b; Mathauer et al., 
2008). Government health spending as a percentage of GDP is estimated at 6% whilst 
27% of this is private health expenditure (WHO, 2012). The health service delivery 
system consists of both formal and informal sectors. The formal health service sector is 
largely public (45%), followed by private service providers (28%), then mission (15%) 
and lastly industry (12%) (SNHP, 2007-2015). On the other hand, the informal sector 
consists of traditional and other unregulated service providers (Mathauer et al., 2008). 
The country is among countries that have not abolished user fees completely but instead 
                                                          
 
 
2 Poverty line is defined as deprivation of wellbeing and a lack of command over basic -commodities like 
food and water.  
3 Risk pooling is risk sharing across a group of people or across the entire population, so that unexpected 
health care expenditure does not fall solely on an individual or household such that both individuals and 
households are protected from catastrophic health expenditures (McIntyre, 2007). 
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have subsidies extended mostly to mission facilities so that they may offer services that 
are deemed basic at an affordable price to the public (Swaziland National Health Policy 
[SNHP] (2007-2015). 
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
Swaziland health spending levels compares favorably to most set targets by the WHO 
for low income countries if they were to attain the goal of UHC. For example, out-of-
pocket as a percentage of total health expenditure has been consistently below the set 
target of 15-20% since 2010 and reaching up to 11% in 2012 (WHO, 2015b). Similar 
observations have been noted with regard to general government expenditure on health 
as a percentage of GDP. Currently the country is recording 6% which is equivalent to the 
current target of 5-6% if low income countries were to improve not only their health status 
indicators and access to care, but also reduce financial catastrophe and impoverishment 
to negligible levels (WHO, 2015b; McIntyre & Meheus, 2014). However, a substantial 
amount comes from private sources with little redistribution or cross-subsidisation. 
 
Further, the country’s National Health Policy (SNHP) acknowledges and advocates for 
the use of need as a criterion to access health services instead of price (user fees) 
(SNHP, 2007-2015). However, the high potential for ﬁnancial catastrophe still remains. 
Currently, a mandatory prepayment mechanism does not exist, and according to a 
feasibility assessment and financial projection for a Social Health Insurance (SHI) 
conducted by WHO in 2008, the country lacks effectual exemption mechanisms for the 
poor from health care payments despite having the latter stated in the SNHP. The 
assessment found that implementing SHI for all Swazis was feasible and with a potential 
for gradual extension of coverage to the informal sector over 10 years. However, this has 
not been implemented as yet (Mathauer et al., 2008). The above challenges have given 
rise to equity and financial protection concerns, particularly because there is limited 
evidence on how the current health financing systems is adequately ensuring financial 
health protection and equal access to care across segments of the population in 
Swaziland.  
 
Evidence from studies conducted among low income countries, including those in Africa, 
have showed that a lack of health financing reforms such as mandatory prepayment 
mechanisms and effectual exempting mechanisms for the poor from health payments, 
increases the likelihood for poor households to experience catastrophic health 
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expenditures and impoverishment (Xu et al., 2003). In addition to the lack of mandatory 
pre-payment mechanisms, the availability of health services requiring payment and low 
capacity to pay have also been identified as preconditions for catastrophic payments (Xu 
et al.,2003; McIntyre & Meheus, 2014).  
 
Currently, WHO, as informed by evidence has recommended minimum health spending 
levels for low-income countries if they were to attain financial health protection. However, 
there have been special cases whereby other countries had fair health spending levels 
but still lack adequate financial health protection for their population (McIntyre & Meheus, 
2014). Similar concerns are held about Swaziland. The country’s health spending levels 
compares fairly to most set targets, but this may not necessarily translate to equitable 
access to health care across the different income groups. Partly, this could be caused 
by the fact that the poor may remain unaccounted for since they are too poor to make 
any health payments, and consequently they end up being classified among those who 
are protected (WHO, 2013). Evidence from Leive & Xu (2008), on a study assessing 
households’ coping mechanisms against out-of-pocket health payments in 15 African 
countries, shows that more than 30% of those households found both in the lowest and 
3rd quantile of income distribution in Swaziland had the sale of productive assets and 
borrowing as their coping mechanisms against out-of-pocket health payments. However, 
the study did not report any incidences of catastrophic payment. 
 
It is therefore of central concern that Swaziland has no baseline evidence to inform 
discussions and actions aimed at addressing issues of financial health protection in the 
country. Therefore, this financial protection assessment intends to bridge the existing 
gap in knowledge and further provide evidence of the country’s status on health equity 
and if its financial protection is consistent with its current health spending levels. 
 
1.3 Study rationale 
 
The slow progress towards adopting financial health protection mechanisms by many 
countries have been attributed to a number of factors among which is the lack of context 
specific evidence to guide policy change (McIntyre, 2007). This is also the case in 
Swaziland. Currently, to the knowledge of the author, no assessment of financial 
catastrophe and impoverishment from out-of-pocket health payments has been 
conducted. As a result, there is a dearth of evidence on the country’s financial health 
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protection status and associated risk factors. This information is crucial for better health 
protection policy guidance. 
 
1.4 Purpose of the study 
 
Primary aim: 
 To assess the consequences of direct out-of-pocket payments on individuals 
and their households in Swaziland. 
 
Specific objectives 
 To quantify the catastrophic effect of out-of-pocket health care payments in 
Swaziland. 
 To assess the impoverishment effects of out-of-pocket health payments in 
Swaziland. 
 To assess factors associated with the absence of financial protection in 
Swaziland. 
 To provide policy recommendations on how to address and improve financial 
health protection in Swaziland.  
 
1.5 Brief literature review 
 
Assessment of financial protection gained prominence after the publication of the World 
Health Report 2000 (McIntyre, 2010). Since then, methodologies to assess equity in 
health financing systems have been developed under the notion of protecting individuals 
and their households, particularly the poor from experiencing catastrophic health 
expenditure (Wagstaff, 2001). In support for financial risk protection, Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer (2003), suggested methodologies for assessing and measuring fairness in 
health care financing. These methodologies were based on the conventional FGT 
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(Foster-Greer-Thorbecke,1984)4 poverty indices and are termed catastrophic and 
impoverishment methodologies (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). The catastrophic and 
impoverishment methodologies were based on the premises of the Grossman-Wagstaff 
model of demand for health. This theory asserts that the cost of health care is reflected 
in the amount of household consumption foregone so as to purchase health care 
(Grossman, 2000). 
 
The catastrophic and impoverishment methodologies have been criticised for solely 
focusing on the direct impact of out-of-pocket payments for health care on households 
and neglecting indirect costs. However, despite the criticisms, these conventional 
methodologies have remained largely used by many in the field (Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 2003). In support for these methodologies, Kutzin, (2010) and Hsiao (2003) 
argued that given the evidence of adverse effects of out-of-pocket payments on 
households, it would be appropriate to use out-of-pocket payments as a focal variable 
for policy makers in attaining financial health protection in a health system. Also, both 
catastrophic and impoverishment methodologies are based on an assumption that 
households do not choose to spend excessively on health care (health care expenditure 
is not discretionary) and that household income is fixed (O’Donnell et al., 2008). On the 
contrary, it is argued that this assumption does not always hold given that households’ 
health payments can be smoothed over by dissaving or borrowing and at times by a 
decision not to spend on health care than experiencing catastrophic payments (Flores et 
al., 2008). 
 
A summary of the review of methodological and empirical studies using the 
conventional methodologies is briefly presented below. 
 
Catastrophic health care payments 
 
                                                          
 
 
4FGT indices as used in conventional poverty measurement show the extent, intensity and the severity of 
poverty (Foster et al. 1984). The extent of poverty is indicated by the headcount measure, while the intensity 
and severity of poverty are indicated by the gap measures. 
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In measuring out-of-pocket payments in relation to catastrophic expenditures, the 
catastrophic methodology uses a predetermined threshold. The threshold is arbitrary in 
nature, as a result, various thresholds are often used. However, there have been 
concerns regarding the use of different thresholds as it often leads to different results. 
To address the latter, it has since been agreed that all thresholds levels should be 
reported instead of reporting on one and the decision should rest with readers (Xu et al., 
2010; Russell, 2004). In addition, evidence has showed that households of different 
socio-economic statuses have different marginal utilities5 with regards to their income, 
and thus applying a standard threshold across may preclude equity considerations. In 
support of this notion there is an argument that fairness should be defined in the indices 
for measuring catastrophic out-of-pocket payments (Ataguba, 2012). 
 
Studies carried out in Africa using the catastrophic methodology have shown a high 
financial burden on households due to direct out-of-pocket payments. A positive 
relationship between catastrophic and out-of-pocket payments has also been observed 
in a multi-country study, consisting of 59 countries. In ten of these countries, it was 
estimated that about 3% of households incurred catastrophic expenditures (Xu et al., 
2003). Further evidence of high levels and intensity of both financial catastrophe and 
impoverishment due to out-of-pocket payments have been shown in studies conducted 
in Ghana and Nigeria (Akazili, 2010; Ichoku, Fonta & Onwujekwe, 2009). Most recently, 
about 23% of Ugandan households were reported to be facing catastrophic health 
expenditure (Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015). Similar trends have been observed 
across Asia, Europe and South America as well (van Doorslaer et al., 2007; Xu et al., 
2003). 
 
While the methodology of assessing catastrophic payments is useful, it fails to show the 
absolute impact of out-of-pocket health payment on households, given that households 
could still be pushed into poverty even by a health payment burden of less than 1% 
(Goudge et al., 2009).Therefore, it remains important to assess the impoverishment 
associated with out-of-pocket payments. 
                                                          
 
 
5 Marginal utility is a notion of utilitarianism. This philosophy advocates for maximization of 
total utility for everyone in society. While utility is a measure of satisfaction that one obtains 
from his/her circumstances. 
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Impoverishment due to out-of-pocket health care payments 
 
This methodology is based on the argument that spending on health care is 
unpredictable and may result in financial shocks and impact a household’s welfare 
negatively. In principle, no one ought to be pushed or deepened into poverty as a result 
of health payments (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). Health payments can be 
impoverishing if they compromise households’ expenditure on basic non-medical goods 
and services such as food and education of household members (Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 2003). Another argument behind the assessment of the impoverishing effects 
of health payments is sustained by van Doorslaer et al., (2006), who assert that the 
conventional approaches to measuring poverty do not capture this form of 
impoverishment since they are not adjusted for health care costs. This applies even to 
higher poverty line in spite of them having room for health expenditure to a certain extent. 
This is because health care needs are highly variable both across time and individuals 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008; van Doorslaer et al., 2006). A famous methodology for assessing 
the impoverishing effects of health payments is by Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (2003). 
Although, this methodology is subject to the choice of a poverty line, it is considered to 
be more objective than the catastrophic methodology. This is because it compares 
household resources net of out-of-pocket against absolute poverty thresholds (Wagstaff 
& van Doorslaer, 2003). 
 
The assessment of impoverishment associated with direct out-of-pocket health care 
payments has not been widely studied in many African countries. A review of some of 
the studies previously conducted mainly in Nigeria, Tanzania and Ghana and most 
recently in Uganda showed a high level of impoverishment due to out-of-pocket 
payments (Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015; Leive & Xu, 2008) . In Ghana, high 
impoverishment was associated with high levels of out-of-pocket payments, which 
constituted a bigger share of total health sector financing (Akazili, 2010). Similar findings 
were observed in Nigeria where individuals and their households had their level of 
poverty increased due to high levels of out-of-pocket payments (WHO, 2013; Ichoku, 
Fonta & Onwujekwe, 2009). In Uganda, based on the Ugandan national poverty lines, 
about 4% of the population was impoverished by out-of-pocket health payments 
(Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015). These findings were found consistent with those 
reported in Asian countries (van Doorslaer et al., 2007; van Doorslaer et al., 2006). 
 
Furthermore, out-of-pocket payments may not only push households to poverty but 
evidence has showed that it can deepen levels of poverty and leave households in a 
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perpetual state of poverty (known as a poverty trap) (Akazili, 2010). This phenomenon 
is mostly observed among households who were previously poor before making health 
care payments. The catastrophic and impoverishment methodologies also have 
limitations. They do not provide information on those who cannot afford to use health 
services as a result of health costs (Moreno-Serra, Millett & Smith, 2011; Wagstaff & van 
Doorslaer, 2003). Consequently, this group is then misclassified as financially protected 
which then results in an underestimation of the adverse consequences of out-of-pocket 
health payments (Moreno-Serra, Millett & Smith, 2011). Thus, it is important to assess 
households’ vulnerability to financial risk. 
 
Household’s vulnerability to financial risk 
 
Household vulnerability is the likelihood of a household facing risk that may cause its 
welfare to decline (Dercon, 2005). There is consensus on the need not only to report the 
catastrophic and impoverishment measurements, but also to report the factors 
associated with households’ vulnerability to catastrophic health spending and 
impoverishment (Moreno-Serra, Millett & Smith, 2011; Xu et al., 2007). It is alleged that 
such information can guide policy makers to better target financial-risk protection 
strategies. 
 
The factors attributing to households experiencing catastrophic health spending greatly 
varies across developed and developing countries. Samkorata (2009), reported that in 
high income countries, the risk of experiencing catastrophic health payments lies mostly 
with better-off households mainly because they prefer expensive services. These 
findings differ greatly with those found in low income countries, particularly in Africa, 
where it is the poor who stand a higher risk compared to the better-off (Xu et al., 2007; 
Xu et al., 2006). In addition to the type of health providers used and low socio-economic 
status, the following factors have been found common across countries; type of care 
consumed, household with members aged 60+ or less than 5 years, households 
members living with a disability or chronic illness, the availability of health services 
requiring payment and lack of mandatory prepayment health financing mechanisms 
(Moreno-Serra, Millett & Smith, 2011; Somkotra & Lagrada, 2009; Xu et al., 2003). 
 
1.6 Methodology and analysis 
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Data source  
 
This study shall employ secondary data from Swaziland Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey (SHIES) 2009-2010. SHIES is a multi-purpose survey conducted on 
a nationwide basis by Central Statistical Office of Swaziland (SCS). Households were 
selected based on a two stage stratified sampling method. In the first stage, 375 
enumeration areas (EAs) were selected with probability proportional to size based on 
2007 population census framework. At the second stage, within each enumeration areas 
(EAs) a fixed number of households were selected by systematic random sampling 
method. The final sample size was 3167 households from which 1373 were urban and 
1794 rural (SHIES, 2010).  
Data analysis shall be conducted using Stata 12 (Stata Corp, 2012).  
 
Methods 
 
a. Measuring social economic status  
 
To assess the effects of direct out-of-pocket payment on households, the socio-
economic status of households shall be measured using household consumption 
expenditure. Consumption is preferred over income in this context because of both 
conceptual and practical considerations. Conceptually, consumption is more stable 
across time than income and practically, it has shown to have less measurement errors. 
This is because households prefer reporting consumption than earnings due to the fear 
of taxation among other reasons (Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). Also, the large informal sector 
found in developing countries further limits the use of income as a measure of household 
welfare. However, using consumption is not without limitations either. Households have 
been found to under report expenditure on luxurious items and lifestyle, such as 
gambling and alcohol. This could result in understatement of poverty estimates 
(Haughton & Khandker, 2009). Nevertheless, the balance tips in favour of using 
consumption considering the various aforementioned advantages over using income, 
particularly in the context of developing countries (Deaton & Zaidi, 2002). 
 
On a different note, reflecting the level of per capita household consumption is of interest 
mostly with respect to the walfarist approach whose focus is on per capita consumption 
expenditure when measuring household utility (Akazili, 2010). However, applying this 
concept alone would be ignoring the fact that some goods and services consumed by 
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the household have ‘public good’ characteristics, meaning that they produce benefits for 
the whole household not just the primary consumer (Haughton & Khandker, 2009; 
O'Donnell et al., 2008). In addition, there is a concern that consumption needs differs 
with age and that has to be put into perspective when reporting household consumption 
expenditure. Thus to reflect economies of scale and consumption needs in the household 
consumption level, household socio-economic status shall be measured using per adult 
consumption expenditure estimates adapted from Ataguba & McIntyre (2012). 
 
𝐴𝐸 = (𝑠𝐴 + ΦS𝐾)
𝜃 for θ ⩾ 0, 0 ⩽  Φ ⩽ 1 
 
Where 𝑠𝐴 is the number of adults in the household; 𝑆𝐾 is the number of children, 𝚽 is the 
cost of children (a measure of the weight accorded to children relative to adults) and θ 
represent economies of scale. Following recommendations by Deaton & Zaidi (2002), 
the following values were set; 𝚽 = 0.5 and θ = 0.75. Also, Ataguba & McIntyre, (2012) 
performed a sensitivity test on these values to see if replacing the adult equivalent scale 
by per capita scale was going to cause any significant change in the results observed, 
and there was no significant change observed.  
 
Furthermore, since household consumption was used as a measure for households’ 
ability to pay, then an asset index shall be constructed to determine any correlation 
between household living standards and impoverishment from health payments. The 
asset index shall be generated using the principal component analysis (PCA) method. 
PCA is a multivariate statistical technique applied to reduce variables in a data set into 
uncorrelated coherent subsets (components). The uncorrelated components are a linear 
weighted combination of the initial variables. This method enables a detailed description 
of the variation of the subset variables in the original data (Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006). 
The asset index, 𝐴𝑖 , for individual 𝑖 is defined below as follows: (method adapted from 
O’Donnell et al., (2008). 
 
𝐴𝑖 = ∑ [𝑓𝑘
(𝑎𝑖𝑘− 𝑎𝑘)
𝑆𝑘
]
𝑘
 
Where: 
–𝑎𝑖𝑘 is the value of asset 𝑘 to household 𝑖 
–𝑎𝑘 is the sample mean 
– 𝑆𝑘is the sample standard deviation 
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–𝑓𝑘 are the weights associated with the first principal component 
 
b. Measuring out-of-pocket payments 
 
Estimating household out-of-pocket payments 
 
Total out-of-pocket payments for each household shall be computed based on all 
expenditures made on health and medical care as captured in the survey data. Payments 
covered by a health insurance or that were reimbursed shall be excluded. 
 
Catastrophic out-of-pocket healthcare payments analysis 
 
Catastrophic out-of-pocket health payments shall be estimated using the methodology 
adapted from Ataguba (2012). The method uses the inequality aversion parameter to 
derive rank dependent thresholds, such that it allows for estimation of catastrophic 
payment relative to the households’ level of socio-economic status. This is different to 
the application of a constant threshold which overlooks equity issues yet is fundamental 
to a fair health care financing system. In essence, this method implies that catastrophe 
is a function of where the household sits in the income distribution range (Ataguba, 
2012). 
 
Using the rank dependent threshold, three indices for catastrophic health payment shall 
be computed namely: 
 Rank dependent catastrophic head count  
 Rank dependent catastrophic payment gap  
 The mean positive rank dependent gap 
 
Rank-dependent catastrophic head count 
 
The rank-dependent catastrophic headcount measures the proportion of households in 
the population or sample that makes catastrophic payments. The indices shall be 
computed as: 
 
𝐻′𝑐𝑎𝑡 = 𝑁
−1  (∑ 𝐸′
𝑖
𝑁
𝑖  =1
) = 𝜇′𝐸′ 
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Where 𝜇′𝐸′  is the mean of 𝐸′𝑖 and N is the total sample size. This measure indicates 
whether households’ out-of-pocket payments, expressed as a fraction of total (non-food 
expenditure) exceed the rank dependant threshold). 
 
Rank-dependent catastrophic payment gap 
 
This captures deviations from the catastrophic threshold across all the observations in 
the quantiles of gross income irrespective of their health payments through, a concept 
known as “the overshoot”. Overshoot shows by how much the catastrophic incidence 
exceed the catastrophic threshold. This index allows us to ascertain the intensity of the 
catastrophic health payments. The indices shall be computed as: 
 
𝐺′𝑐𝑎𝑡 = 𝑁
−1  (∑ 𝑂′𝑖
𝑁
𝑖  =1
) = 𝜇′𝑂′ 
 
Where 𝜇′𝑂′ is the mean of 𝑂
′
𝑖
 (mean of overshoot) 
 
The mean positive rank dependent gap 
 
Given that the 𝐺′𝑐𝑎𝑡  averages across all the observations, for a detailed analysis, a rank 
dependent overshoots excluding the zeros (the households whose health payments as 
a share of their income is below the set threshold) shall be computed. The mean positive 
rank shall be defined as: 
 
𝑃𝐺′𝑐𝑎𝑡 =
∑ 𝑂′
𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐸′
𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 𝜇
′
𝑜′
𝜇
′
𝐸′
⁄  
 
c. Impoverishment effect of out-of-pocket-payments 
 
The catastrophe measures do not tell to what degree catastrophe payments cause 
hardship among households. The impoverishment effect of out-of-pocket payment shall 
be estimated using poverty measures as applied in Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003). 
 
Poverty headcount index 
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This index measures the proportion of households that are poor.  
Given that 𝑧𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 = pre-payment poverty line and 𝑥𝑖  = individuals (𝑖) pre-payment income. 
Then we define; 
 
𝑃𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒 = 1 if  𝑥𝑖 < 𝑧𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 
 
Then the pre-payment poverty headcount is defined as: 
𝐻𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 𝜇𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒 
Where N is the sample size. It important to note that 𝐻𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 does not capture the “depth” 
of poverty hence the need to measure the poverty gap. 
 
Poverty gap index (𝐺). 
 
This index gives the depth or extent of the poverty, that is, the amount (%) by which poor 
households fall short of reaching the poverty line (𝐺). Denote 𝑔𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒 the pre-payment 
poverty gap. This is equal to 𝑥𝑖 −  𝑧𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 if 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑧𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒, and zero otherwise. Then pre- 
payment poverty gap is defined as: 
 
𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 𝜇𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒 
 
The normalized pre-payment poverty gap  
This index is the weighted sum of the poverty gaps as a proportion of the poverty line. It 
shows the severity of poverty among the poor (Akazili, 2010). Also, it allows comparisons 
across countries with different poverty lines (O’Donnell et al., 2008). The normalized pre-
payment poverty gap index is defined as: 
 
𝑁𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 =
𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒  
 
Mean positive pre-payment poverty gap 
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This index measures the intensity of poverty. Its only includes the average poverty gap 
of the poor as a proportion of the poverty line. The mean positive gap is defined as: 
 
𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 = ∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑁
𝑖=1
⁄ =  𝜇𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝜇𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒⁄  
 
We therefore have  
𝜇𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒 =  𝜇𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒 . 𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 
This means that the average (prepayment) poverty gap is equal to the fraction of 
households who are poor (positive gap) multiplied by the average deficit of the poor 
(mean positive gap). 
 
To obtain post-payment indices which is analogous to the pre-payment indices, we 
replace the pre-payment poverty line 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 by the post-payment poverty line 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 and all 
other superscripts ‘𝑝𝑟𝑒’ by the superscript ‘𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡‘. 
 
Then poverty impact of out-of-pocket payment is defined as the difference between the 
relevant pre-payment and post-payment measures. This is written below: 
 
Impoverishment head count is defined as: 
 
𝑃𝐼𝐻 = 𝐻𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐻𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 
 
Impoverishment gap is defined as: 
 
𝑃𝐼𝐺 = 𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 
 
Normalized impoverishment gap is defined as: 
 
𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝑁𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑁𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 
 
While mean positive gap is defined as:  
 
𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑁𝐺 = 𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 
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d. Factors associated with incurring catastrophic and impoverishing payments 
 
Factors associated with a household incurring catastrophic payments and 
impoverishment shall be determined using multivariate logistic regression adapted from 
O’Donnell et al., (2005) and Knaul et al., (2007). 
 
Model Specification: The logistic model that shall be used is as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑛 [
𝜋(𝑥)
1 − 𝜋(𝑥)
] = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖 
 
Where 𝜋(𝑥) is the probability that the response variable (catastrophic payment or 
impoverishment) 𝑌𝑖 = 1; 𝛼 is the constant and 𝛽 are the coefficient of the predictor 
variables (𝜒). The independent variables shall include; location, education, socio-
economic status, sex of household head, use of facility and out-of-pocket payment. 
 
1.7 Poverty line 
 
When assessing the impoverishing effect of out-of-pocket payments, a poverty line has 
to be applied (O’Donnell et al., 2008). A poverty line is defined as the value of 
consumption necessary to satisfy minimum subsistence needs (Akazili, 2010). Poverty 
can either be relative or absolute. Relative poverty lines express poverty in relation to a 
percentage of mean or median consumption in a country, while the absolute poverty line 
expresses poverty with respect to the absolute amount of consumption/money per capita 
required to meet minimum subsistence needs (Wagstaff et al., 2011). Two absolute 
poverty lines shall be applied in the study, and these are the national (Swazi) and 
international poverty lines. The national poverty line stands at E461.00 which is equal to 
US$ 97.46 in 2010 power parity purchasing (PPP) terms. The international poverty line 
was established by the World Bank and it is $1.25 per capita/day. This is equivalent to 
E5.91 in 2010 PPP terms. Worth noting is that the poverty lines shall then be annualised 
as the study time reference is one year. 
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1.8 Research Ethics  
This study shall use secondary household survey data. Therefore, no significant ethical 
concerns pertaining to participants exist. However, ethics approval shall be obtained 
from the Human Research Ethical Committee (HREC) of the University of Cape Town 
before conducting the study. 
 
1.9 Dissemination 
 
The study findings shall be disseminated through publications. Two publications based 
on the study findings were prepared as partial fulfilment of the Masters in Public Health 
specialising in Health Economics. These include a journal article and a policy brief. The 
journal article shall be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal for publication. 
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2.1  Introduction 
 
This literature review aims to give a structured theoretical, methodological and empirical 
review (synthesised and critically appraised evidence found) of previous related work 
conducted with regard to the assessment of financial health protection.  
 
2.2 Theoretical and methodological literature 
 
The theoretical section aims to provide theoretical debates in relation to assessing 
financial protection in health. These will further inform the conceptual framework used in 
this study. The theoretical literature is divided into four parts: First, the financial burden 
of illness on households due to health payments; second, determinants of household 
vulnerability to financial risk; third, the role of health system financing and the role of out-
of-pocket health care payments, and lastly the methods for assessing catastrophe and 
impoverishment. 
 
2.2.1 Financial burden of illness on the household due to direct health payments 
 
Health related shocks are assumed as the biggest threats to households’ welfare and 
financial stability with the consequences worse among the poor (Gertler & Gruber, 1997). 
This is so because illness is unpredictable, yet it necessitates expenditures that 
households may be poorly equipped to deal with. This is the case especially with the 
poor that allocate a greater share of their income to basic necessities, like food (McIntyre 
et al., 2006; Wagstaff, 2002; Whitehead, Dahlgren & Evans, 2001; Wagstaff & Van 
Doorslaer, 2000). This suggests that the financial burden of illness is disproportionately 
more among poor households than the rich (McIntyre et al., 2006). Exacerbating this is 
the high disease burden among the poor compared to the rich. As a result, poor 
households are constantly faced with health shocks that eventually result in high 
expenditures and consequently displace spending on non-medical basic needs; a 
phenomena called the ‘medical poverty trap’ (Whitehead, Dahlgren & Evans, 2001).  
 
This notion is consistent with the renowned Wagstaff-Grossman model of demand for 
health care. The theory posits that the cost of health care is reflected by the basic needs 
consumption foregone in order to spend on health care (Grossman, 2000). This has led 
to the assumptions that poverty and ill-health are interrelated and the association is multi-
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directional, meaning that poverty is a predictor of ill-health and the reverse is true (WHO, 
2010; Leive & Xu, 2008; McIntyre et al., 2006; Wagstaff, 2002; Whitehead, Dahlgren & 
Evans, 2001; Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer, 2000). 
 
Further, it is believed that spending on health care is less of a choice (non-discretionary) 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008; Wagstaff, 2002; Whitehead, Dahlgren & Evans, 2001). However, 
this assumption is not without debate given that some households may prefer not to 
spend on health care to avoid incurring catastrophic expenditures (Flores et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, in many cases, the poor would pay for health care in spite of their low 
ability to pay and consequently suffer the greatest (O'Donnell et al., 2008; Whitehead, 
Dahlgren & Evans, 2001). 
 
On the other hand, households do not only divert the income originally meant for 
spending on basic needs in order to meet health care costs but they also adopt coping 
mechanisms, such as the sale of productive assets and borrowing (McIntyre et al., 2006). 
However, these coping mechanisms are not sufficient to protect households’ 
consumption against the illnesses related shocks, particularly those that are associated 
with hospitalisation and conditions that limit one’s physical activity (Leive & Xu, 2008; 
Gertler & Gruber, 1997). Instead, they limit households’ ability to cope with future health 
shocks by straining their income generating capacity (Leive & Xu, 2008; McIntyre et al., 
2006; Gertler & Gruber, 1997). Thus there is a greater need to identify the most 
vulnerable groups to ensure their protection against financial risk associated with health 
care payments. 
 
2.2.2 Determinants of household vulnerability to financial risk 
 
Household vulnerability is the likelihood of a household facing risk that may cause its 
welfare to decline (Dercon, 2005). It is conjectured that certain groups and households 
have a greater propensity to suffer financial risks than others and thus, there is a need 
for policy interventions to not only seek to contain the health care costs, but also to 
protect the most ‘at risk’ groups. In order to achieve the latter, it would be necessary for 
policy makers to have knowledge about the determinants of households’ vulnerability to 
financial risk. 
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Theoretical arguments on household vulnerability to financial risk appear to suggest that 
the level of out-of-pocket health care payment experienced is driven by type, quantity 
and the extent of third party coverage for the services consumed, as well as individuals’ 
ability to pay (McIntyre, 2007; Xu et al., 2003; Crystal et al., 2000). In light of this view, 
factors that predict household vulnerability to financial risks can be thought of, in part, in 
terms of those predictive of health service utilisation (Crystal et al., 2000). Applying this 
concept, (Horstman, 2007), as cited in (Maredza, 2009) adapted the Andersen and 
Newman framework of health services utilisation to develop a conceptual framework for 
analysing determinants of catastrophic health expenditures. The framework constitutes 
of two factors whose interaction presumably triggers out-of-pocket payments whose 
consequences can either be catastrophic to households (i.e., increasing household 
vulnerability to financial risk) or not (Maredza, 2009). These factors are namely 
household characteristics and health services utilisation. (See figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for analysing determinants of catastrophic 
health expenditures. 
 
Adapted from Maredza (2009).  
 
A brief summary of the two factors  
 
The household characteristics 
 
The household characteristics are divided into pre-disposing factors, enabling factors 
and illness level. Predisposing factors are those characteristics that increase the 
likelihood of a household’s use of healthcare services and consequently incurring 
catastrophic health expenditures. The associated factors include: demographic 
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composition of the household, household size, household head educational level and 
employment status. 
 
Enabling factors are the conditions or resources that enable households to respond to 
their health care needs. They are presumed to resemble households’ ability to pay. They 
include households’ income level, assets and whether the household has access to 
insurance or not. The last component of household characteristics is illness level and it 
includes the type of illness, illness episodes and the presence of a household member 
living with a disability. 
 
The interaction between these characteristics also has a theoretical basis according to 
Grossman’s human capital model of the demand for health care (Grossman, 2000). The 
model states that the demand for health capital is determined by the future wage rate, 
the marginal cost of investment in health and the future depreciation of health 
(Grossman, 2000). The model views health as a durable capital stock that yields an 
output of healthy times and individuals are born with an inherited stock of health which 
depreciates over time but can be increased with investments (such as, consumption of 
preventive medical care and healthy life styles). The model predicts that the ‘shadow 
price’ of health care rises with age if the rate of depreciation on the stock rises over the 
life cycle and falls with education. This theory posits that the elderly are more likely to 
suffer illness whilst the educated are efficient producers of health (leading a healthy life 
style and investing in preventative medicine). On the other hand, the model suggests 
that an increase in the shadow price may simultaneously reduce the quantity of health 
care demanded and increase the quantities of health inputs (health care) demanded 
(Grossman, 2000). In that case, a household with a member with chronic illness can be 
expected to consume more health care (inputs) and consequently incur more costs 
(Habibov, 2009). 
 
On the other hand, education is associated with improved household welfare since it is 
associated with better earnings (Grossman, 2000). Hence education could be 
considered as an enabling factor for households to spend more on health care. This line 
of thought is consistent with the law of demand which predicts an increase in demand of 
services with an increase in income at least for normal goods (Mankiw, 2011) Thus, 
those households with more disposable income would be expected to demand more 
services than their poorer counterparts. 
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Health service use  
Most countries have their health services provision organised into three parts namely: 
primary, secondary and tertiary. The assumption is that the volume and costs of care 
tend to increase with the level of service (McIntyre, 2007). Therefore, households with 
individuals that require advanced care such as hospitalisation can be expected to face a 
higher risk of incurring catastrophic health expenditure than those consuming care at 
lower levels. 
 
2.2.3 The role of health system financing  
Health system financing is one of the six building blocks of the health system, with the 
other five being governance, information, service delivery, medical products and health 
work force (Hort et al., 2010). The role of health system financing in the attainment of 
financial health protection is perceived to be critical (WHO, 2010). A health system is 
defined as any organisation, people and actions whose primary intent is to promote and 
restore or maintain health (WHO, 2007). There are conceptual frameworks that have 
been developed to enhance understanding of the functions of the financing component 
of the health system and commonly used conceptual frameworks are those suggested 
by Hsiao (2003) and Kutzin (2001). Kutzin’s framework is mainly descriptive of the health 
system financing functions of collecting revenue, pooling resources and purchasing 
services. Also, the framework appears to place an emphasis on prepayment 
mechanisms for maximum income and risk cross subsidisation (Hort et al., 2010). 
 
On the other hand, Hsiao’s conceptual framework is explicitly more analytical than 
descriptive and it modelled the role of health system financing function within the 
systemic aspect of the health system as a key element that determines the observed 
goals of the health system. (See Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Relationship between financing instrument and goals  
 
 
Adapted from Hort et al.,(2010) 
 
Hsiao’s framework postulates that financing is a policy instrument available to policy 
makers in order to achieve the health system’s final goals (health status, financial 
protection and consumer satisfaction). Out-of-pocket payment is one of the mechanisms 
for financing health care. Others include tax based and pre-payment mechanisms 
(insurances) (McIntyre, 2007). Out of the three health care system financing 
mechanisms, out-of-pocket payment is the most regressive mechanism that does not 
offer cross-subsidisation between individuals of different income groups and illness 
(McIntyre, 2007). As such, the burden of health care payment remains solely on 
individuals and their households. 
 
The concern is that, out-of-pocket payments displaces household spending on other 
basic necessities like food and further drive previously non-poor households into poverty 
and deepens poverty for those who were already poor (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). 
There is a common take on the idea that if health care systems were to achieve financial 
health protection for their populations, out-of-pocket health care payments would need 
not be the major source of health care financing within countries, but prepayment 
mechanisms instead (WHO, 2010). This idea has incited the measurement of financial 
health protection among countries not only with the intention to know the level of financial 
health protection but also to inform health care policies aimed at improving financial 
health protection among countries. 
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2.2.4 Measurement of financial burden of out-of-pocket health care payments  
 
The publication of the World Health Report [WHR] (2000) did not only detail the functions 
of the health system but it also gave assessment of financial health protection a centre 
stage. Furthermore, the report illustrated that the role of health systems was not only to 
ensure good health but also to protect households financially by ensuring fairness in 
health care financing. In the WHR, fairness was defined as having households 
contributing to health care financing according to ability to pay6 (WHR., 2000). In an effort 
to promote assessment of the financial burden of out-of-pocket payments on households, 
the WHR proposed an index of fairness in health care financing called Fairness of 
Financial Contribution index (FFC). However, this index was never without criticisms as 
it was constructed from the premise that health payments ought to be proportional to 
ability to pay. This means that irrespective of where one sits on the income distribution 
range, they ought to contribute a similar proportion of their income to health care 
(Wagstaff, 2001). Also this index failed to discriminate between progressive, regressive 
and horizontally inequitable health financing. As such, this index is regarded as 
inadequate to measure fairness in health care financing, more so because it violates the 
principle of vertical equity7. This principle’s fundamental objective is to reduce the welfare 
gaps post payment between the poor and the rich (Wagstaff, 2001). Those that subscribe 
to this notion believe that a measure of financial ‘hurt’ in the context of health financing 
should also recognise that the ‘hurt’ will vary by income level (Ataguba, 2012). 
 
Most of the methodologies for assessing financial protection in health are based on the 
convectional Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) poverty indices and on the assumption that 
spending on health care is involuntary (non-discretionary) and household income is fixed 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008). However, these assumptions are not without debate. Some 
theorists argue that households’ health care expenditure can be smoothed over by 
coping mechanisms adopted (Flores et al., 2008). Notwithstanding the latter argument, 
lots of debates around this subject appear to support this assumption under the argument 
                                                          
 
 
6 Ability to pay is a measure of household total disposable income after spending on subsistence or non-
medical basic necessities such as food and water. 
7 Vertical equity is a principle that involves unequal but equitable treatment of unequals or reducing welfare 
gaps between unequal individuals. So, in health financing, it demands that households of unequal ability to 
pay make appropriately dissimilar payments.  
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that health care is predicted to restore healthy days; a condition that is desirable to many 
regardless of income level (O'Donnell et al., 2008; Whitehead, Dahlgren & Evans, 2001). 
In assessing financial risk protection, methodologies measures the catastrophic and 
impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket health care payments on households (Wagstaff & 
van Doorslaer, 2003). In addition to the latter, there is also assessment of factors that 
are associated with households’ vulnerability to financial risk (Somkotra & Lagrada, 
2009; Xu et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2003). 
 
2.2.5 Methodologies for assessing the financial burden of health care payments 
and associated risk factors 
 
This section discusses the theoretical debates around the methods commonly used in 
assessing the burden of out-of-pocket health care payments on households and 
associated risk factors. The methods are namely: i) The catastrophic impacts of out-of-
pocket health care payments; ii) The impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket health care 
payments; iii) Measurement of vulnerability to financial risk as a result of out-of-pocket 
health care payments. 
 
The catastrophic impacts of out-of-pocket health care payments 
 
In the assessment of catastrophic impact of out-of-pocket health payments, the concern 
is not about the absolute amount of out-of-pocket payment but rather the share of health 
payments made relative to the households’ available resources (O'Donnell et al., 2008; 
Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). This is because it is hypothesised that even modest 
health care payments in absolute terms can be catastrophic depending on where one 
sits on the income distribution range (Ataguba, 2012). Out-of-pocket health care 
payments are regarded as catastrophic when they exceed a certain fraction or threshold 
of the household’s living standard (income or total expenditure) in a given period which 
is usually a year (O'Donnell et al., 2008). The ethical concern here is that spending a 
large fraction of household income on health care will compromise household’s ability to 
spend on other basic non-medical necessities, e.g., food, clothing and shelter (Wagstaff 
& van Doorslaer, 2003). According to O’Donnell et al., (2008), the extent to which 
households’ living standards are seriously disrupted by out-of-pocket health care 
payments should be estimated using longitudinal data as this could allow for observation 
of the adverse consequences of out-of-pocket health care payments on households 
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overtime. However, in the event of the availability of cross-sectional data, approximation 
should be made (O'Donnell et al., 2008). 
 
The catastrophic impact of out-of-pocket health payments could be defined either with 
respect to household income (or using total consumption expenditure as a proxy) or 
capacity to pay which is effective income remaining after basic subsistence needs have 
been met (O'Donnell et al., 2008; Wyszewianski, 1986). There are two key variables 
involved in the measurement of catastrophic expenditure namely, total household out-
of-pocket health care payments (numerator) and a measure of household resources or 
living standards (denominator) (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). In an event when total 
household expenditure is used as a denominator, catastrophic expenditure is defined 
with respect to health payments budget share (share of total expenditure), whereas in 
the case of capacity to pay, catastrophe is defined in relation to health payment as a 
share of total expenditure net spending on basic necessities (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 
2003). It is important to note that traditionally, the threshold goes with the measure of 
household’s living standard chosen, which is normally 10% if payments are defined as a 
budget share, and 40% in the case of capacity to pay (Wagstaff, 2003; O’Donnell et al., 
2008). It is however, important to note that the thresholds are arbitrary in nature as they 
lack scientific bases and there is no consensus on a standard threshold yet, instead there 
has been a consensus that more than one thresholds levels should be reported and the 
selection decisions shall remain with the readers (O'Donnell et al., 2008; Xu et al., 2007). 
This is thought to reduce bias and guide decision-making in an informed manner.  
 
While the capacity to pay approach is most preferred compared to income by most 
literature, there were reservations concerning its use, particularly on how and what to 
define as subsistence expenditure (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). To address this 
challenge, studies have used total expenditure (income) net food spending to define 
capacity to pay (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003; Xu et al.,2003). 
 
Overall, this methodology gives the extent and intensity of catastrophic out-of-pocket 
payments in a given sample of households which have been exposed to health payments 
and whose health care costs as a share of total (or non-food) expenditure exceeded the 
chosen threshold (Wagstaff, 2003). However, given the theory of justice and the wide 
concern for equity, it is believed that reporting the incidences of catastrophic health 
payments without showing how they vary across income distribution might be of less 
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value to society. Thus, some authors use the concentration index8 to adjust the measures 
of financial catastrophe to account for whether the poor or rich face more financial 
catastrophe (Wagstaff, 2003). However, this methodology is limited in that the indices 
themselves are based on those categorised as making payments and it ignores those 
households, particularly the poor who could not afford health payments and 
consequently forego treatment (Wagstaff et al., 2011).  
 
Unfortunately, this group is believed to suffer greater welfare loss than those incurring 
catastrophic payments (Wagstaff et al., 2011). Also, this methodology assumes that the 
threshold be constant across households of different living standards, a concept viewed 
similar to proportionality which violates the principle of vertical equity that underpins the 
notion of fair health financing (Ataguba, 2012). In this regard, some authors have 
suggested that subjecting households of different income levels to similar thresholds 
would be unfair and unethical and that catastrophe should rather be a function of where 
the household sits in the income distribution (Ataguba, 2012; Onoka et al., 2011). 
 
However, the current methodologies for examining catastrophic health payment are 
informative of at least part of the catastrophic economic consequences of illness without 
identifying the extent to which catastrophic payments cause hardship among 
households. Thus there is a need to assess the impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket 
health care payments on households (O'Donnell et al., 2008; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 
2003). This is so because catastrophic health payments can push previously non-poor 
households into poverty at the same time deepening the already poor further into 
poverty. 
 
The impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket health care payment 
 
In principle, no one ought to be pushed or deepened into poverty as a result of health 
care payments (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer,2003; WHO,2010). Health payments are 
deemed impoverishing if households’ standard of living is lowered (pushed below the 
poverty line) and or the previously poor are made worse-off as a result of payments 
                                                          
 
 
8 Concentration is a measure used to identify whether socioeconomic inequality in some health sector 
variable exists and whether it is more pronounced in one group or another. 
44 | P a g e  
 
(O'Donnell et al., 2008; Gertler & Gruber, 1997). An argument behind the assessment of 
the impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket health payment is that this form of 
impoverishment is not captured by the conventional approaches for measuring poverty 
which normally applies the standard poverty lines (Akazili, 2010). The conventional 
approaches compare total household expenditure to poverty lines that are normally not 
adjusted for health care costs (O'Donnell et al., 2008). This limitation applies even to 
higher poverty lines which are argued to have implicit allowance for the costs of health 
care, but because of the stochastic nature of households’ health care need they are often 
deemed inadequate (Wagstaff et al., 2011; O'Donnell et al., 2008; van Doorslaer et al., 
2006). 
 
To assess the impoverishment effects of out-of-pocket payments, a local or international 
poverty line is used to compare households’ living standard pre out-of-pocket payment 
and post out-of-pocket payment, such that any resultant increment in poverty headcounts 
post payment is the impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket health payments (Wagstaff & 
van Doorslaer, 2003). The international poverty lines recommended by the World Bank 
are $1.25/day and $2 day at Purchasing Power Parity dollar values of 2005 ( Wagstaff 
et al., 2011). 
 
While this methodology gives the extent (impoverishment headcount) and intensity 
(impoverishment gap) of poverty caused by health care payments, it does not provide 
information on households’ vulnerability to financial hardship (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer 
2003). Thus, there is a need to assess household factors that are associated with 
financial risk in order for policy makers to target the most at risk groups (Knaul et al., 
2007). 
 
Measurement of vulnerability to financial risk as a result of out-of-pocket health 
care payment 
 
In assessing household vulnerability to financial risk the binary response models (i.e., 
logit and probit) have been commonly applied by many studies. The logit and probit 
models assume that there is some continuous latent variable y* that determines 
participation (incurring catastrophic expenditure), so y* can be viewed as the households’ 
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propensity to incur catastrophic health expenditure. The logit and probit models are 
estimated by the method of maximum likelihood estimation9 (Jones, 2006). 
Previous work have looked at both household characteristics and the use of health 
services (level of care and volume) in assessing the factors associated with households’ 
vulnerability to financial risk as a result of out-of-pocket health care payments. The 
households’ characteristics include household size and composition, household health 
insurance status and household-head (educational, sex and employment) statuses 
(Saksena, Smith & Tediosi, 2014; Knaul et al., 2011; O’Donnell et al., 2005). It is 
however, important to note that the literature also indicated that there has been empirical 
work conducted previously on factors outside the household level such as health system 
financing (Wagner et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2003). 
 
2.3 Empirical review 
 
Literature search strategy  
 
Keywords: catastrophe, catastrophe, impoverishment, out-of-pocket; financial; 
assessment; determinants; factors and correlates. 
 
A search of keywords was conducted on electronic databases namely; Africa-Wide 
Information, Medline, Academic Search Premier via EBSCOhost and Web of Sciences 
(core collection and all data bases separately) and lastly Google Scholar. The keywords 
were combined with common terms around the topic (such as; household, costs, risk, 
burden, poverty, health care and payment) using Boolean operators “AND and OR”.  
 
Abstracts of identified studies were read and the full texts of relevant documents were 
retrieved for inclusion in the review. Also, reference lists of retrieved studies were further 
searched to identify additional relevant publications. The databases search was 
supplemented by a search of relevant organisational websites and the use of grey 
literature such as theses that were deemed related to the topic understudy. 
                                                          
 
 
9 Maximum likelihood estimation is a method of estimation that specifies the joint probability of the observed set of 
data and finds the parameter values that maximize it. 
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The visited organisational websites are namely: 
http://www.who.int 
http://www.worldbank.org 
 
Inclusion and exclusion criteria  
 
The inclusion criteria were specified according to the objective of the study, which is to 
assess the catastrophic and impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket health payment and 
the associated factors. For a document to be included, it needed to have applied 
theoretically and scientifically sound methodologies for determining the following; 
catastrophic health expenditure, impoverishment effects out-of-pocket payments and 
determinants or risk factors associated with households facing financial risk. 
 
Only studies written in English language were included in the review. Also, they must 
have been conducted using nationally representative surveys. However, studies 
conducted in Africa meeting these criteria were limited. As a result, there were a few 
studies from Africa that did not use a nationally representative survey but were 
considered. Their inclusion was relevant in order to provide some evidence from Africa 
on financial risk protection.  Most of these studies looked at financial risk protection in 
relation to specific diseases (e.g., TB and Malaria). 
 
Altogether, a total number of 38 studies were reviewed, and, of these studies 29, 15 and 
20 looked at catastrophic expenditure, impoverishment and associated factors 
respectively. It is important to note that some studies focused on all the sub-topics at 
once while others examined either one or two of the sub-sections (catastrophe, 
impoverishment and risk factors). 
 
While there was no country restriction applied in the search, apart from the multi-country 
studies, all other studies were intentionally abstracted from low and middle income 
countries mostly from Asia, Africa and Latin America. This is because low and middle 
income countries were considered most relevant considering that Swaziland is ranked 
as a lower-middle income country.  
A summary of the findings and characteristics for each study reviewed is presented 
according to the three sub-sections in the following manner; empirical work for assessing 
catastrophe, impoverishment and associated factors. 
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2.3.1 Studies assessing the catastrophic impact of health care payments 
 
Brief summary of the reviewed evidence 
 
Studies reviewed were found to have employed observational study designs, namely 
cross-sectional studies. The studies may be divided into three main categories namely; 
cross-country, individual country and disease specific. The countries considered in the 
cross-country studies differed in many respects e.g., income level, region, 
epidemiological and demographic trends. 
 
The methodology proposed by Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (2003) and that by Xu et al 
(2003) received wider application by most studies reviewed. The Wagstaff and van 
Doorslaer (2003) methodology proposes assessing catastrophic out-of-pocket payments 
in relation to total or non-subsistence household (consumption/income) expenditure 
against a predetermined threshold level of 10% or 40% in a case of total and total non-
food expenditure respectively. Worth noting is that, this methodology simple takes the 
amount spent on food without necessarily considering if that particular amount spent 
meets the minimum calorie intake for the households. On the other hand, the 
methodology by Xu et al., (2003), uses the total non-food approach (thresholds level of 
40%) similar to that of Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (2003), but, it further proposes 
deduction of a fixed food allowance across all households regardless of the reported 
amount (Xu, 2005). This method also has its own limitation in that, some households are 
likely to have a negative residual following the deduction of the allowance. 
 
However, it is important to note that studies using the latter methodologies employed a 
wide range of threshold levels ranging from 2.5% by Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (2003) to 
60% by Kouyate & Flessa (2006). This was consistent with O’Donnell’s (2008) 
recommendation to present results from a wide range of thresholds in order to enhance 
informed decision making. 
 
On the other hand, the incidence of catastrophic expenditure was higher among lower 
threshold levels, with a tendency to decline with increasing threshold levels (Kwesiga, 
Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015; Ilunga-Iunga et al., 2015; Ataguba, 2012; Chuma & Maina, 
2012; Onoka et al., 2011; Akazili, 2010).This indicated that the extent of catastrophic 
health expenditure among poor households is likely to be missed with use of higher 
threshold levels alone (Arsenijevic, Pavlova & Groot, 2013; O'Donnell et al., 2008). 
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In addition to assessing the extent, a few studies further examined the catastrophic 
payment gap, mean positive gap, distribution of catastrophe with income and ranked 
weighted measures (Séne & Cissé, 2015; Ataguba, 2012; Chuma & Maina, 2012; 
Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). Both weighted and un-weighted measures declined 
with increasing threshold levels and the weighted measures were higher than un-
weighted measures whenever catastrophic payments were concentrated among 
households in the lower expenditure quintile. This observation explicitly implies that the 
burden of health care payment was more among poor households compared to their 
better-off counterparts (O'Donnell et al., 2008). (Table 1, presents a summary of the 
studies reviewed). 
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io
na
l s
ur
ve
y,
 
(H
ea
lth
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 a
nd
 
ut
ili
za
tio
n 
su
rv
ey
). 
(2
00
7)
 
 
A
ll 
no
n-
re
im
bu
rs
ed
 
di
re
ct
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 
m
ad
e 
to
 h
ea
lth
 
ca
re
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
 
(in
cl
ud
in
g 
dr
ug
s 
co
st
s)
. 
 
A
da
pt
ed
 W
ag
st
af
f &
 v
an
 D
oo
rs
la
er
 
(2
00
3)
, m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
. 
A
ls
o 
pr
es
en
te
d 
w
ei
gh
te
d 
in
di
ce
s 
(h
ea
dc
ou
nt
 a
nd
 in
te
ns
ity
).
 
C
H
E
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 b
ot
h 
to
ta
l a
nd
 n
on
-s
ub
si
st
en
ce
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
T
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
an
d 
in
te
ns
ity
 o
f C
H
E
 w
er
e 
in
ve
rs
el
y 
pr
op
or
tio
na
l t
o 
in
co
m
e 
in
 b
ot
h 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 s
ha
re
 a
pp
ro
ac
he
s 
an
d 
al
l 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
 a
pp
lie
d.
 
T
he
 p
oo
r s
uf
fe
r t
he
 g
re
at
es
t. 
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U
se
d 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
as
 a
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
H
H
’s
 s
oc
io
ec
on
om
ic
 s
ta
tu
s 
(S
E
S
).
 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
s 
ap
pl
ie
d:
10
, 3
0 
&
 4
0%
 
T
he
 w
ei
gh
te
d 
in
di
ce
s 
te
nd
 to
 b
e 
hi
gh
er
 th
an
 
th
e 
un
-w
ei
gh
te
d 
in
di
ce
s 
ac
ro
ss
 th
re
sh
ol
ds
 
an
d 
in
co
m
e 
le
ve
l. 
T
he
 in
di
ce
s 
by
 n
on
-f
oo
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 s
ha
re
 
w
er
e 
hi
gh
er
 th
an
 th
os
e 
ob
se
rv
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
to
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 m
ea
su
re
 in
 g
en
er
al
. 
Fl
or
es
 e
t a
l.,
 
(2
00
8)
 
In
di
a 
N
at
io
na
l s
u
rv
ey
 
(1
99
5–
19
96
) 
 
 
D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 
m
ad
e 
fo
r h
ea
lth
 
se
rv
ic
es
. 
 
A
da
pt
ed
 W
ag
st
af
f &
 v
an
 D
oo
rs
la
er
 
(2
00
3)
, m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
. 
T
he
y 
al
so
 a
cc
ou
nt
ed
 fo
r f
in
an
ci
al
 
co
pi
ng
 s
tra
te
gi
es
. 
H
H
 S
E
S
 w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 H
H
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 a
nd
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n.
 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
 le
ve
ls
 a
pp
lie
d:
 5
%
, 1
0%
, 
an
d 
20
%
. 
T
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
fo
r C
H
E
 w
as
 g
en
er
al
ly
 
hi
gh
er
 a
t l
ow
er
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
 in
 b
ot
h 
th
e 
ad
ju
st
ed
 a
nd
 u
na
dj
us
te
d 
m
ea
su
re
s.
 A
ls
o,
 
th
e 
ad
ju
st
ed
 m
ea
su
re
s 
w
er
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 
sm
al
le
r c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 th
e 
un
ad
ju
st
ed
, 
m
ea
su
re
s.
 (
Th
is
 in
di
ca
te
d 
th
e 
H
H
s’
 a
bi
lit
y 
to
 s
m
oo
th
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
in
 a
n 
ev
en
t o
f 
he
al
th
 s
ho
ck
s)
 
Fo
r u
na
dj
us
te
d:
 a
t t
he
 5
%
, 1
0%
 a
nd
 2
0%
 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 w
as
 
3.
4%
, 2
.2
%
 a
nd
 1
%
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y 
fo
r r
ur
al
, 
w
hi
ls
t f
or
 u
rb
an
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
w
as
 a
bo
ut
 
4%
, 2
.4
%
 a
nd
 1
%
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y 
at
 s
im
ila
r 
th
re
sh
ol
ds
 le
ve
ls
. 
Fo
r a
dj
us
te
d:
 a
t t
he
 5
%
, 1
0%
 a
nd
 2
0%
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 w
as
 0
.5
2%
, 0
.2
1%
 a
nd
 
0.
04
%
 fo
r r
ur
al
 w
hi
le
 fo
r u
rb
an
 it
 w
as
 a
bo
ut
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0.
83
%
, 0
.3
0%
, 0
.0
8%
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y 
at
 s
im
ila
r 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
.  
G
ot
sa
dz
e,
 
Zo
id
ze
 &
 
R
uk
ha
dz
e 
(2
00
9)
 
G
eo
rg
ia
 
N
at
io
na
l s
ur
ve
y,
 
H
ea
lth
 C
ar
e 
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
an
d 
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
 
su
rv
ey
  
(2
00
7)
. 
C
os
ts
 c
om
m
itt
ed
 to
 
he
al
th
 c
ar
e 
pr
ov
id
er
s 
fo
r h
ea
lth
 
ca
re
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
dr
ug
s.
 
A
da
pt
ed
 X
u 
et
 a
l.,
 (2
00
3)
, 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
. 
C
H
E
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 to
ta
l 
no
n-
fo
od
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
. H
H
 S
E
S
 
w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 H
H
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
 a
pp
lie
d 
40
%
. 
T
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 w
as
 a
t 1
1.
7%
. 
Ilu
ng
a-
Ilu
ng
a 
et
 
al
.,2
01
4 
D
em
oc
ra
tic
 
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
on
go
 
D
is
tri
ct
 p
at
ie
nt
  
su
rv
ey
 
D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
t 
m
ad
e 
fo
r M
al
ar
ia
 
ca
re
 a
nd
 tr
ea
tm
en
t. 
A
da
pt
ed
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 p
ro
po
se
d 
by
 
X
u 
et
 a
l (
20
03
).
 
H
H
 S
E
S
 w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 
C
H
E
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 to
 
bo
th
 to
ta
l a
nd
 n
on
-f
oo
d 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 T
hr
es
ho
ld
 le
ve
ls
 
ap
pl
ie
d:
 1
0%
 a
nd
 4
0%
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
A
t t
he
 4
0%
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l t
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 
C
H
E
 w
as
 8
1.
1%
 a
nd
 4
6.
4%
 a
t t
he
 1
0%
 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l. 
K
w
es
ig
a,
 
Zi
ku
so
ok
a 
&
 
A
ta
gu
ba
 (2
01
5)
 
U
ga
nd
a 
N
at
io
na
l s
ur
ve
y,
 
(2
00
9/
10
).
 
 
D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 
m
ad
e 
to
 h
ea
lth
 
ca
re
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
tra
di
tio
na
l 
m
ed
ic
in
es
 
T
he
 s
tu
dy
 a
da
pt
ed
 A
ta
gu
ba
, 
(2
01
2)
, m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
. 
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
w
as
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
H
H
 S
E
S
. 
A
t t
he
 5
%
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l, 
th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 
C
H
E
 w
as
 a
t 3
8%
 w
hi
ls
t a
t t
he
 1
0%
, 1
5%
 &
 
25
%
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
w
as
 
ab
ou
t 2
2%
, 1
5%
 &
 7
%
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
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ex
cl
ud
in
g 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
re
im
bu
rs
em
en
ts
.  
T
hr
es
ho
ld
s 
ap
pl
ie
d 
5%
,1
0%
,1
5%
 
25
%
 
 
T
he
 c
at
as
tro
ph
ic
 p
ay
m
en
t g
ap
 v
ar
ie
d 
fr
om
 
3.
8%
 a
t t
he
 5
%
 in
iti
al
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l t
o 
0.
8%
 a
t t
he
 2
5%
 in
iti
al
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l. 
T
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
an
d 
in
te
ns
ity
 b
ot
h 
de
cl
in
ed
 
w
ith
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 th
re
sh
ol
d.
 
La
ok
ri 
et
 a
l.,
 
20
14
 
B
en
in
 
P
at
ie
nt
 T
B
 s
ur
ve
y 
(2
00
8-
20
09
) 
 
D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 
m
ad
e 
fo
r T
B
 c
ar
e 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
dr
ug
s.
 
A
pp
lie
d 
W
ag
st
af
f &
 v
an
 D
oo
rs
la
er
 
(2
00
3)
, m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
. 
C
H
E
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 u
si
ng
 th
e 
to
ta
l 
he
al
th
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 a
pp
ro
ac
h.
 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
s 
ap
pl
ie
d:
 5
%
, 1
0%
, 
15
%
, 2
0%
 a
nd
 2
5%
. 
A
t t
he
 1
0%
 th
re
sh
ol
d,
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 
w
as
 7
1.
8%
 w
hi
le
 th
e 
ca
ta
st
ro
ph
ic
 a
nd
 
m
ea
n 
po
si
tiv
e 
ga
p 
w
as
 a
bo
ut
 7
.8
%
 a
nd
 
14
.8
%
 r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 
T
he
 b
ur
de
n 
w
as
 h
ig
he
r a
m
on
g 
th
os
e 
in
 th
e 
po
or
es
t q
ui
nt
ile
. 
La
ra
 
&
 
G
om
ez
 
(2
00
9)
 
B
og
ot
a,
 
C
ol
um
bi
a 
N
at
io
na
l s
ur
ve
y,
 
H
ea
lth
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
U
se
 a
nd
 
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
 
S
tu
dy
.(2
00
1)
 
 D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
t 
m
ad
e 
fo
r h
ea
lth
 
se
rv
ic
es
. 
 
A
da
pt
ed
 X
u 
et
 a
l.,
 (2
00
3)
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
. 
C
H
E
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s 
he
al
th
 
pa
ym
en
t e
xc
ee
di
ng
 2
0%
 o
f t
ot
al
 
no
n-
fo
od
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
. 
T
he
 a
ve
ra
ge
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 w
as
 4
.5
%
. 
M
ill
s 
et
 
al
.,(
20
12
) 
G
ha
na
, 
T
an
za
ni
a 
an
d 
S
ou
th
 
A
fr
ic
a 
N
at
io
na
l s
ur
ve
ys
. 
 
D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 
m
ad
e 
to
 h
ea
lth
 
pr
ov
id
er
s 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
re
im
bu
rs
em
en
t. 
C
H
E
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 te
rm
s 
on
 to
ta
l 
no
n-
fo
od
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
H
H
 S
E
S
 w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
 le
ve
l a
pp
lie
d:
 4
0%
. 
 
O
n 
av
er
ag
e,
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 in
 
G
ha
na
, T
an
za
ni
a 
an
d 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
w
as
 
2.
43
%
, 1
.5
2%
, a
nd
 0
.0
9%
 r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
 
Fo
r b
ot
h 
G
ha
na
 a
nd
 T
an
za
ni
a 
th
e 
w
ei
gh
te
d 
in
de
x 
ex
ce
ed
ed
 th
e 
un
w
ei
gh
te
d 
in
de
x,
 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
th
at
 th
e 
bu
rd
en
 o
f C
H
E
 w
as
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di
sp
ro
po
rti
on
at
el
y 
m
or
e 
am
on
g 
po
or
 H
H
s 
th
an
 th
e 
ric
h.
 
M
in
h 
et
 a
l.,
 
(2
01
2)
 
V
ie
tn
am
 
N
at
io
na
l s
ur
ve
y 
 
(L
iv
in
g 
S
ta
nd
ar
d 
S
ur
ve
y)
,  
(2
00
2-
20
10
). 
 
D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 
m
ad
e 
to
 h
ea
lth
 
ca
re
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
 fo
r 
he
al
th
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
re
-
im
bu
rs
em
en
t a
nd
 
tra
ns
po
rt 
co
st
s.
 
 
T
he
 s
tu
dy
 a
do
pt
ed
 X
u 
et
 a
l.,
 (2
00
3)
 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
. 
S
E
S
 w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 
C
H
E
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 b
ot
h 
to
ta
l a
nd
 n
on
-s
ub
si
st
en
ce
 H
H
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
 u
se
d 
40
%
. 
T
he
 p
ro
po
rti
on
s 
of
 H
H
s 
w
ith
 c
at
as
tro
ph
ic
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 a
t t
he
 4
0%
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l i
n 
20
02
, 2
00
4,
 2
00
6,
 2
00
8 
an
d 
20
10
 w
er
e 
4.
7%
, 5
.7
%
, 5
.1
%
, 5
.5
%
 a
nd
 3
.9
%
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
T
he
 re
su
lt 
in
di
ca
te
d 
th
at
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 
C
H
E
s 
de
cl
in
ed
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
tly
 o
ve
r t
he
 y
ea
rs
. 
A
ls
o,
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 w
as
 in
ve
rs
el
y 
pr
op
or
tio
na
l t
o 
in
co
m
e 
an
d 
th
e 
tre
nd
 w
as
 
si
m
ila
r i
n 
bo
th
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 a
pp
ro
ac
he
s 
(c
ap
ac
ity
 to
 p
ay
 a
nd
 to
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
) 
La
st
ly
, t
he
 c
ap
ac
ity
 to
 p
ay
 b
as
ed
-m
ea
su
re
s 
ha
d 
hi
gh
er
 in
di
ce
s 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 th
e 
to
ta
l 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
-b
as
ed
 m
ea
su
re
s.
 
N
gu
ye
n,
 
R
aj
ko
tia
 &
 
W
an
g,
 (2
01
1)
 
G
ha
na
’s
 tw
o 
di
st
ric
ts
  
(N
ko
ra
nz
a 
&
 
O
ffi
ns
o)
. 
D
is
tri
ct
 s
ur
ve
y.
 
 (2
00
7)
 
 
D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
t 
m
ad
e 
to
 h
ea
lth
 
ca
re
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
pr
ev
en
ta
tiv
e 
ca
re
 
co
st
s.
 
H
H
 S
E
S
 w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 b
ot
h 
in
co
m
e 
an
d 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 
C
H
E
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 
in
co
m
e 
an
d 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
 
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
: f
or
 th
e 
un
in
su
re
d 
gr
ou
ps
 a
t t
he
 1
0%
 &
 2
0%
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
 
us
in
g 
th
e 
no
n-
fo
od
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 a
pp
ro
ac
h,
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 
C
H
E
 w
as
 a
bo
ut
 2
.6
%
 a
nd
 2
%
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
W
hi
le
 th
e 
in
su
re
d 
at
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
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le
ve
ls
 re
co
rd
ed
 a
bo
ut
 1
.5
%
 a
nd
 0
.9
%
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
In
co
m
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
: A
t t
he
 5
%
 a
nd
 1
0%
 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
, f
or
 th
e 
un
in
su
re
d 
gr
ou
ps
 
th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 w
as
 2
.1
%
 a
nd
 
2.
8%
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y 
w
he
re
as
 fo
r t
he
 in
su
re
d 
m
em
be
rs
 re
po
rte
d 
ab
ou
t 1
.2
%
 a
nd
 1
.5
%
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
T
he
 s
tu
dy
 fo
un
d 
he
al
th
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
as
 
pr
ot
ec
tiv
e 
ag
ai
ns
t C
H
E
. 
O
’D
on
ne
ll 
et
 
al
.,(
20
05
) 
B
an
gl
ad
es
h,
 
H
on
g 
K
on
g,
 
In
di
a,
 S
ri 
La
nk
a,
 
T
ha
ila
nd
 a
nd
 
V
ie
tn
am
. 
N
at
io
na
l s
ur
ve
ys
, 
(1
99
6-
20
02
).
 
 
D
ire
ct
 c
os
ts
 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
re
im
bu
rs
em
en
ts
. 
 
A
da
pt
ed
 W
ag
st
af
f &
 v
an
 D
oo
rs
la
er
 
(2
00
3)
, m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
. S
E
S
 w
as
 
es
tim
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
C
H
E
 w
as
 e
xp
re
ss
ed
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 
to
ta
l h
ea
lth
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
. 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
 a
pp
lie
d 
10
%
. 
T
he
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 H
H
s 
ex
ce
ed
in
g 
th
e 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
va
rie
d 
fr
om
 3
-3
.5
%
 in
 S
ri 
La
nk
a 
an
d 
T
ha
ila
nd
 to
 m
or
e 
th
an
 1
5%
 in
 
B
an
gl
ad
es
h 
an
d 
V
ie
tn
am
. I
t w
as
 a
lm
os
t 6
%
 
in
 H
on
g 
K
on
g 
an
d 
ab
ou
t 1
1%
 in
 In
di
a.
 
O
no
ka
 e
t a
l.,
 
(2
01
1)
 
N
ig
er
ia
’s
 tw
o 
st
at
es
. 
(E
nu
gu
 &
 
A
na
m
br
a)
. 
S
ta
te
s 
su
rv
ey
, 
(2
00
8)
. 
 
D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 
m
ad
e 
to
 h
ea
lth
 
ca
re
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
tra
ns
po
rt 
co
st
s.
 
M
od
ifi
ed
 W
ag
st
af
f &
 v
an
 D
oo
rs
la
er
 
(2
00
3)
, m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
. 
C
H
E
 w
as
 e
xa
m
in
ed
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
no
n-
fo
od
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 a
nd
 a
 s
et
 o
f 
va
ria
bl
e 
an
d 
fix
ed
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
. 
In
 th
e 
ca
se
 o
f n
on
-f
oo
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 (4
0%
 
fix
ed
 th
re
sh
ol
d)
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 w
as
 
14
.8
%
. 
U
si
ng
 th
e 
va
ria
bl
e 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
(a
t i
ni
tia
l 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
5%
 fo
r t
he
 p
oo
re
st
 a
nd
 2
9.
6 
%
 fo
r 
th
e 
ric
he
st
) t
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 w
as
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V
ar
ia
bl
e 
th
re
sh
ol
ds
 w
er
e 
w
ei
gh
te
d 
by
 a
 ra
tio
 o
f H
H
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 o
n 
fo
od
. M
ea
su
re
 o
f H
H
 S
E
S
 w
as
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 
44
.7
%
 a
nd
 1
2%
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y,
 a
nd
, t
he
 
ov
er
al
l i
nc
id
en
ce
 w
as
 3
6.
5%
.  
T
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
by
 th
e 
va
ria
bl
e 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
w
as
 
hi
gh
er
 th
an
 th
e 
fix
ed
 a
pp
ro
ac
h.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O
nw
uj
ek
w
e,
 
H
an
so
n 
&
 
U
zo
ch
uk
w
u 
(2
01
2)
 
N
ig
er
ia
 
S
ta
te
 s
ur
ve
y 
H
ea
lth
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 
co
ns
is
te
d 
of
 d
ire
ct
 
pa
ym
en
t m
ad
e 
to
 
he
al
th
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
 
A
da
pt
ed
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 p
ro
po
se
d 
by
 
X
u 
et
 a
l.,
 (2
00
3)
. 
5%
 n
on
-f
oo
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l w
as
 u
se
d 
to
 c
om
pu
te
 o
ve
ra
ll 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
. 
H
H
 S
E
S
 w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 
O
ve
ra
ll,
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
s 
w
as
 a
bo
ut
 
27
%
, a
nd
 th
ey
 te
nd
 to
 d
ec
lin
e 
w
ith
 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 in
co
m
e 
le
ve
ls
. 
S
ak
se
na
 e
t a
l.,
 
(2
01
1)
 
R
w
an
da
. 
N
at
io
na
l s
ur
ve
y,
 
(In
te
gr
at
ed
 
Li
vi
ng
 C
on
di
tio
ns
 
S
ur
ve
y)
. 
(2
00
5-
20
06
) 
 
 
D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
t 
m
ad
e 
to
 h
ea
lth
 
pr
ov
id
er
s 
fo
r 
se
rv
ic
es
 e
xc
lu
di
ng
 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
re
-
im
bu
rs
em
en
t. 
 
A
do
pt
ed
 X
u 
et
 a
l.,
 (2
00
3)
, 
m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
.  
H
H
 S
E
S
 w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 
C
H
E
s 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 
te
rm
s 
of
 n
on
-s
ub
st
an
ce
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
s:
 1
0%
, 2
0%
 a
nd
 4
0%
. 
(T
he
 s
tu
dy
 re
po
rte
d 
ov
er
al
l i
nc
id
en
ce
 o
f 
C
H
E
 a
nd
 a
ls
o 
fo
r u
n-
in
su
re
d 
ho
us
eh
ol
d)
. 
O
ve
ra
ll,
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 w
as
 1
6.
2%
, 
8.
7%
 a
nd
 2
.9
%
 fo
r t
he
 1
0%
, 2
0%
 a
nd
 4
0%
 
th
re
sh
ol
ds
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y 
W
he
re
as
 fo
r t
he
 u
ni
ns
ur
ed
 H
H
, t
he
 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 w
as
 3
2%
, 1
7%
 a
nd
 5
.8
%
 
at
 th
e 
10
%
, 2
0%
 a
nd
 4
0%
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
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T
he
 b
ur
de
n 
of
 h
ea
lth
 p
ay
m
en
t w
as
 h
ig
he
r 
am
on
g 
th
os
e 
un
in
su
re
d.
 In
 b
ot
h 
gr
ou
ps
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 d
ec
lin
ed
 w
ith
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 
th
re
sh
ol
d,
 in
di
ca
tin
g 
th
at
 th
e 
bu
rd
en
 o
f 
he
al
th
 p
ay
m
en
t w
as
 h
ig
h 
am
on
g 
po
or
 H
H
s.
 
S
en
e 
&
 C
is
se
 
(2
01
5)
 
S
en
eg
al
 
N
at
io
na
l s
ur
ve
y,
 
P
ov
er
ty
 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
su
rv
ey
 
(2
01
1)
 
D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
t 
m
ad
e 
to
 h
ea
lth
 
ca
re
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
tra
ns
po
rt 
co
st
s.
 
R
ei
m
bu
rs
ed
 c
os
ts
 
w
er
e 
ex
cl
ud
ed
. 
T
he
 s
tu
dy
 a
da
pt
ed
 th
e 
su
pp
le
m
en
ta
l p
ov
er
ty
 m
ea
su
re
s 
(S
P
M
) 
al
on
g 
w
ith
 th
e 
W
ag
st
af
f &
 
va
n 
D
oo
rs
la
er
 (2
00
3)
 m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
 
to
 e
st
im
at
e 
ca
ta
st
ro
ph
ic
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s.
 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
 to
 h
ea
dc
ou
nt
 th
e 
st
ud
y 
al
so
 re
po
rte
d 
th
e 
m
ea
n 
po
si
tiv
e 
ga
p 
an
d 
th
e 
de
gr
ee
 o
f i
nc
om
e–
re
la
te
d 
in
eq
ua
lit
y 
in
 th
e 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 C
H
E
 u
si
ng
 th
e 
co
nc
en
tra
tio
n 
in
de
x 
(C
E
). 
C
H
E
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 to
 
bo
th
 to
ta
l a
nd
 n
on
-f
oo
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
H
H
 S
E
S
 w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 
T
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
an
d 
in
te
ns
ity
 o
f c
at
as
tro
ph
e 
w
er
e 
hi
gh
er
 a
t l
ow
er
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
 a
nd
 
te
nd
ed
 to
 d
ec
lin
e 
w
ith
 a
 ri
se
 in
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
 e
.g
. a
t t
he
 5
%
 le
ve
l (
16
.2
%
) 
an
d 
at
 
th
e 
25
%
 le
ve
l (
1.
10
%
).
 
T
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 c
at
as
tro
ph
e 
w
as
 g
en
er
al
ly
 
hi
gh
er
 w
ith
 th
e 
no
n-
fo
od
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 to
ta
l h
ea
lth
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
, a
nd
 a
 
si
m
ila
r t
re
nd
 w
as
 n
ot
ed
 w
ith
 re
ga
rd
s 
to
 th
e 
w
ei
gh
te
d-
ba
se
d 
m
ea
su
re
s.
 
T
he
 C
E
 re
m
ai
ne
d 
co
nc
en
tra
te
d 
am
on
g 
th
e 
po
or
 in
 a
ll 
th
e 
th
re
sh
ol
ds
 le
ve
l. 
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T
hr
es
ho
ld
s 
ap
pl
ie
d:
 5
%
, 1
0%
, 
15
%
, 2
0%
 a
nd
 2
5%
. 
S
u,
 K
ou
ya
te
 &
 
Fl
es
sa
 (2
00
6)
 
B
ur
ki
na
 F
as
o 
D
is
tri
ct
 S
ur
ve
y 
H
ea
lth
 D
is
tri
ct
 
su
rv
ey
. 
(2
00
0-
20
01
).
 
 
D
ire
ct
 c
os
ts
 o
f 
he
al
th
 c
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
tra
ns
po
rt 
co
st
s 
fo
r t
ra
ns
po
rt,
 
fo
od
 a
nd
 lo
dg
in
g 
ne
t i
ns
ur
an
ce
 
re
im
bu
rs
em
en
t. 
S
E
S
 w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
H
H
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 a
s 
a 
pr
ox
y 
fo
r 
H
H
 
in
co
m
e.
 C
at
as
tro
ph
ic
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 
w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
-te
rm
s 
of
 n
on
-f
oo
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
s 
ap
pl
ie
d:
 2
0%
,3
0%
,4
0 
an
d 
60
%
 
T
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 c
at
as
tro
ph
e 
w
as
 h
ig
he
r 
am
on
g 
H
H
s 
fo
un
d 
in
 th
e 
lo
w
es
t q
ui
nt
ile
. F
or
 
ex
am
pl
e 
at
 th
e 
20
%
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l, 
th
e 
po
or
es
t H
H
s 
re
po
rte
d 
ab
ou
t 2
6%
 
ca
ta
st
ro
ph
e 
he
ad
co
un
t w
hi
ls
t t
he
 b
et
te
r 
of
f 
in
 th
e 
hi
gh
es
t i
nc
om
e 
qu
in
til
e 
re
po
rte
d 
13
.5
%
 
 
T
om
in
i, 
P
ac
ka
rd
 
&
 T
om
in
i (
20
12
) 
A
lb
an
ia
 
N
at
io
na
l s
ur
ve
y 
 (L
iv
in
g 
S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
S
ur
ve
y 
) 
( 2
00
2,
 2
00
5 
an
d 
20
08
) 
D
ire
ct
 h
ea
lth
 
pa
ym
en
ts
 m
ad
e 
to
 
he
al
th
 c
ar
e 
pr
ov
id
er
s 
by
 H
H
s.
  
A
da
pt
ed
 W
ag
st
af
f a
nd
 v
an
 
D
oo
rs
la
er
 (2
00
3)
. 
H
H
 S
E
S
 w
as
 e
st
im
at
ed
 u
si
ng
 H
H
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
s 
ap
pl
ie
d:
 5
%
, 1
0%
, a
nd
 
20
%
. 
T
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 d
ec
lin
ed
 w
ith
 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 th
re
sh
ol
ds
 a
nd
 in
co
m
e 
th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 th
e 
ye
ar
s 
e.
g.
, i
n 
20
02
 a
t t
he
 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l 5
%
, 1
0%
, 1
5%
 a
nd
 2
5%
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 C
H
E
 w
as
 3
6.
5%
, 2
2.
6%
, 
14
.9
%
 a
nd
 8
.1
%
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 A
 s
im
ila
r 
pa
tte
rn
 w
as
 m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
by
 th
e 
ov
er
sh
oo
ts
 
an
d 
m
ea
n 
po
si
tiv
e 
ov
er
sh
oo
t e
st
im
at
es
. 
T
he
re
 w
as
 a
 d
ec
lin
e 
in
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 
C
H
E
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
ye
ar
s 
(2
00
2,
 2
00
5 
an
d 
20
08
) 
as
 in
di
ca
te
d 
by
 th
e 
re
sp
ec
tiv
e 
es
tim
at
es
  
22
.6
%
, 1
7.
6%
 a
nd
 1
3.
3%
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
61
 |
 P
a
g
e
 
 
U
kw
aj
a 
et
 a
l.,
 
(2
01
3)
. 
N
ig
er
ia
, 
E
bo
ny
i 
S
ta
te
. 
T
B
 P
at
ie
nt
s-
 
D
is
tri
ct
 s
ur
ve
y.
  
 (2
00
7)
 
 
D
ire
ct
 c
os
ts
 fo
r T
B
 
tre
at
m
en
t a
nd
 c
ar
e 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
tra
ns
po
rt 
an
d 
co
pi
ng
 c
os
ts
. 
A
pp
lie
d 
th
e 
W
ag
st
af
f &
 v
an
 
D
oo
rs
la
er
 (2
00
3)
, m
et
ho
do
lo
gy
. 
T
he
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f S
E
S
 w
as
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 
C
H
E
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 te
rm
s 
of
 b
ot
h 
to
ta
l a
nd
 n
on
-f
oo
d 
H
H
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
. 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
s 
ap
pl
ie
d:
 1
0%
 a
nd
 4
0%
. 
T
he
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 c
at
as
tr
op
he
 d
ec
lin
ed
 w
ith
 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
. 
A
bo
ut
 6
5%
 H
H
s 
w
er
e 
re
po
rte
d 
to
 h
av
e 
ex
pe
rie
nc
ed
 C
H
E
s 
at
 th
e 
10
%
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l w
hi
le
 a
bo
ut
 4
4%
 a
t t
he
 4
0%
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l. 
  
W
ag
st
af
f &
 v
an
 
D
oo
rs
la
er
 
(2
00
3)
 
V
ie
tn
am
 
N
at
io
na
l s
ur
ve
y,
 
(L
iv
in
g 
S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
S
ur
ve
ys
 (V
LS
S
).
 
(1
99
2-
19
93
) 
(1
99
7-
19
98
) 
 
P
ay
m
en
ts
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
tre
at
m
en
t i
nc
lu
di
ng
 
in
pa
tie
nt
 c
ar
e 
bu
t 
no
t r
ei
m
bu
rs
ed
. 
C
at
as
tro
ph
ic
 h
ea
lth
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 
(C
H
E
) 
w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
 b
ot
h 
to
ta
l 
an
d 
no
n-
su
bs
is
te
nc
e 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
T
he
 s
tu
dy
 fu
rth
er
 a
ss
es
se
d 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
ca
ta
st
ro
ph
ic
 p
ay
m
en
t g
ap
 
(G
ca
t);
 m
ea
n 
po
si
tiv
e 
ga
p 
(M
P
G
ca
t) 
an
d 
ra
nk
-w
ei
gh
te
d 
in
di
ce
s 
(h
ea
d 
co
un
t i
nc
id
en
ce
 a
nd
 
in
te
ns
ity
).
 
A
 c
on
ce
nt
ra
tio
n 
in
de
x 
(C
E
) 
w
as
 
al
so
 u
se
d 
to
 a
ss
es
s 
th
e 
de
gr
ee
 o
f 
in
co
m
e–
re
la
te
d 
in
eq
ua
lit
y 
in
 th
e 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 C
H
E
. 
In
 b
ot
h 
ye
ar
s 
an
d 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
sh
ar
es
, t
he
 h
ea
dc
ou
nt
 a
nd
 g
ap
 d
ec
lin
ed
 
ov
er
 th
e 
ye
ar
s 
(1
99
3-
19
98
). 
A
ls
o,
 b
ot
h 
ra
nk
-w
ei
gh
te
d 
in
di
ce
s 
no
ta
bl
y 
de
cl
in
ed
 w
ith
 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
va
lu
es
 in
 b
ot
h 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 s
ha
re
s 
as
 w
el
l. 
Fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e;
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
to
ta
l 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
in
 1
99
3,
 th
e 
w
ei
gh
te
d 
he
ad
co
un
t a
t t
he
 5
%
, 1
0%
 a
nd
 1
5%
 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
 w
er
e 
38
.6
%
, 1
8.
2%
 a
nd
 
9.
2%
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
In
 th
e 
to
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
pa
ym
en
ts
 
w
er
e 
co
nc
en
tra
te
d 
am
on
g 
th
e 
po
or
 o
nl
y 
at
 
lo
w
er
 th
re
sh
ol
ds
 le
ve
ls
 w
hi
ls
t a
ll 
ga
p 
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T
hr
es
ho
ld
s 
ap
pl
ie
d 
in
 th
e 
to
ta
l 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 c
as
e:
 
2.
5%
, 5
%
, 1
0%
 &
 1
5%
. 
T
hr
es
ho
ld
s 
ap
pl
ie
d 
in
 th
e 
no
n-
su
bs
is
te
nc
e 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 (c
ap
ac
ity
 to
 p
ay
) 
ca
se
: 
10
%
 2
0%
, 3
0%
 &
 4
0%
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
w
er
e 
co
nc
en
tra
te
d 
am
on
gs
t t
he
 
ric
h.
 
In
 th
e 
no
n-
su
bs
is
te
nc
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 b
ot
h 
ca
ta
st
ro
ph
ic
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 g
ap
s 
ar
e 
co
nc
en
tra
te
d 
am
on
g 
th
e 
po
or
 b
ut
 le
ss
 s
o 
in
 
19
98
 a
t t
he
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 3
0%
 a
nd
 
40
%
. 
In
 g
en
er
al
, a
ll 
ra
nk
- w
ei
gh
te
d 
w
el
fa
re
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
de
cl
in
ed
 w
ith
 in
cr
ea
si
ng
 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
ls
 in
 b
ot
h 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 in
di
ce
s 
by
 th
e 
no
n-
su
bs
is
te
nc
e 
(c
ap
ac
ity
 to
 p
ay
) 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 
w
er
e 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 h
ig
he
r t
ha
n 
th
os
e 
of
 to
ta
l 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
, e
.g
., 
in
19
98
 a
t t
he
 th
re
sh
ol
d 
le
ve
l o
f 1
0%
, t
he
 w
ei
gh
te
d 
he
ad
co
un
t i
n 
th
e 
to
ta
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 w
as
 1
3.
8%
 w
hi
ls
t i
t s
to
od
 
at
 4
7%
 in
 th
e 
to
ta
l n
on
-s
ub
si
st
en
ce
 
ap
pr
oa
ch
. 
X
u 
et
 a
l.,
 (2
00
7)
 
N
= 
89
 
C
ou
nt
rie
s 
fr
om
 d
iff
er
en
t 
in
co
m
e 
M
ul
ti-
co
un
tr
y,
 
N
at
io
na
l s
ur
ve
ys
. 
(1
99
0-
20
03
) 
 
D
ire
ct
 p
ay
m
en
t 
m
ad
e 
to
 h
ea
lth
 
ca
re
 p
ro
vi
de
rs
 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
re
im
bu
rs
em
en
t. 
 
A
pp
lie
d 
th
e 
X
u 
et
 a
l.,
 (2
00
3)
, 
m
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2.3.2 Studies assessing the impoverishing effects of health care payments 
 
Brief summary of the reviewed evidence  
 
Given that the catastrophic measures do not indicate the financial hardship caused to 
households by out-of-pocket health payments, literature was further reviewed for studies 
that assessed the impoverishing effects of such payments. The argument here is that 
not every household experiencing catastrophic health expenditures gets impoverished, 
however, the burden of health care payments could be worse for poor households who 
spend a bigger share of their income on food such that in the event of illness they are 
required to trade-off spending on food for health payments (O'Donnell et al., 2008).  
 
Under this section, a total number of sixteen studies were reviewed both from low and 
high income countries. Most studies applied either the national or international poverty 
line11 to define poverty. However, there were a few that used both poverty lines (Kwesiga, 
Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015; Arsenijevic, Pavlova & Groot, 2013; Mills et al., 2012; 
Akazili, 2010), while Wagstaff & van Doorslaer (2003) applied the food (extreme) poverty 
line and a broad based poverty line. In addition to the poverty headcount, only a few 
studies reported the poverty gap measures (normalized, mean positive gap) (Narci, 
Sahin & Yuldirm, 2015; Akazili, 2010; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). Furthermore, it 
was noted that higher poverty lines yielded higher estimates compared to lower poverty 
lines (Akazili, 2012; van Doorslaer, 2006). This evidence supports the notion that the 
impoverishing effect of health expenditure mimics the existing patterns of poverty in a 
society; countries with high poverty levels are likely to report high levels of 
impoverishment from out-of-pocket payments (Arsenijevic, Pavlova & Groot, 2013). (See 
Table 2, below summarising characteristics of the studies reviewed). 
                                                          
 
 
11 Poverty lines are measures of household standard of living. National poverty lines define poverty in 
relation to minimum acceptable absolute amount of household expenditure per capita computed using 
country specific measures/income level. Whilst the international poverty lines were developed by the World 
Bank. 
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2.3.3 Studies assessing the factors associated with households’ vulnerability to 
financial risk 
 
Brief summary of the reviewed evidence 
 
Based on the review, most studies used either linear or multivariate regression analysis. 
A few exceptions include Knaul et al., (2011) who compared sub-groups within each 
country by the factors associated with incurring catastrophic expenditure; Akinkugbe, 
Chama-Chiliba & Tlotlego, (2012) using bivariate and chi-square analysis and lastly 
Habibov, (2009) who applied a tobit regression. 
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In
co
m
e 
le
ve
l; 
H
H
 h
ea
d 
(g
en
de
r, 
ed
uc
at
io
na
l s
ta
tu
s,
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
st
at
us
 a
nd
 m
ar
ita
l s
ta
tu
s)
; 
lo
ca
tio
n;
 H
H
 s
iz
e.
 
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 fo
un
d 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 H
H
 
in
cu
rr
in
g 
fin
an
ci
al
 ri
sk
: 
In
 B
ot
sw
an
a:
 
B
ei
ng
 ru
ra
l; 
H
H
 h
ea
d 
w
ith
 le
ss
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
lo
w
 in
co
m
e 
st
at
us
. 
In
 L
es
ot
ho
: 
A
ge
s>
65
 y
ea
rs
 a
nd
  l
ar
ge
 H
H
 s
iz
e 
B
ar
ro
s 
et
 a
l.,
 
(2
01
1)
 
B
ra
zi
l 
N
at
io
na
l 
su
rv
ey
, 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 
B
ud
ge
t 
S
ur
ve
y 
 
(2
00
2-
20
03
) 
 
T
ot
al
 
an
d 
no
n-
fo
od
 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
P
oi
ss
on
 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
In
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
S
ex
 o
f H
H
-h
ea
d;
 b
ei
ng
 u
n-
in
su
re
d;
 H
H
 m
em
be
r a
ge
 >
60
 
ye
ar
s 
an
d 
m
or
e 
th
an
 tw
o 
ch
ild
re
n;
 
ra
ce
 a
nd
 in
co
m
e 
le
ve
l. 
B
ei
ng
 p
oo
r, 
H
H
s 
liv
in
g 
w
ith
 a
n 
el
de
rly
 
m
em
be
rs
 a
nd
 b
ei
ng
 in
su
re
d.
 H
H
-h
ea
d 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
an
d 
ch
ild
re
n 
w
er
e 
fo
un
d 
ha
vi
ng
 n
o 
co
rr
el
at
io
n 
w
ith
 C
H
E
. 
B
rin
da
, 
A
nd
re
s 
&
 
E
ne
m
ar
k 
(2
01
4)
 
T
an
za
ni
a 
N
at
io
na
l 
pa
ne
l 
S
ur
ve
y.
 
(2
00
8-
20
09
) 
 
N
on
-
su
bs
is
te
nc
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
Li
ne
ar
 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
m
od
el
  
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
In
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s.
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
A
ge
; g
en
de
r; 
H
H
-h
ea
d 
(m
ar
ita
l, 
ed
uc
at
io
na
l a
nd
 o
cc
up
at
io
na
l 
Fa
ct
or
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 C
H
E
: 
La
rg
e 
H
H
 s
iz
e;
 u
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
 H
H
 h
ea
d;
 
ch
ro
ni
c 
ill
ne
ss
es
.  
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st
at
us
); 
as
se
t i
nd
ex
; d
is
ab
ili
ty
 a
nd
 
m
or
bi
di
ty
. 
E
km
an
 
(2
00
7)
 
Za
m
bi
a 
N
at
io
na
l 
su
rv
ey
. 
Li
vi
ng
 
C
on
di
tio
ns
 
M
on
ito
rin
g 
S
ur
ve
y.
 
(1
99
0)
 
no
n-
su
bs
is
te
nc
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
M
ul
tiv
ar
ia
te
 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
In
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
H
ea
d 
of
 H
H
 (a
ge
, s
ex
 a
nd
 
ed
uc
at
io
n 
le
ve
l);
 in
co
m
e 
; l
oc
at
io
n;
 
di
st
an
ce
 to
 h
ea
lth
 p
ro
vi
de
r;
 
pr
es
en
ce
 o
f i
lln
es
s 
Fa
ct
or
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
ris
k 
of
 C
H
E
s 
w
er
e 
na
m
el
y;
 b
ei
ng
 n
ot
 in
su
re
d;
 a
ge
 6
0+
 
ye
ar
s;
 lo
ng
 d
is
ta
nc
e 
to
 c
ar
e 
po
in
t. 
In
 s
um
m
ar
y,
 th
e 
fin
di
ng
s 
ill
us
tra
te
 th
at
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f f
in
an
ci
al
 ri
sk
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
by
 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
is
 la
rg
el
y 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
co
un
tr
y’
s 
co
nt
ex
t. 
G
ot
sa
dz
e,
 
Zo
id
ze
 &
 
R
uk
ha
dz
e 
(2
00
9)
 
G
eo
rg
ia
 
N
at
io
na
l 
su
rv
ey
 
(2
00
7)
. 
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
lo
gi
st
ic
 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
(lo
gi
t) 
m
od
el
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
in
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 ty
pe
 o
f 
ill
ne
ss
, S
E
S
, a
nd
 le
ve
l o
f c
ar
e.
 
Fa
ct
or
s 
fo
un
d 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 C
H
E
 w
er
e 
na
m
el
y:
 h
os
pi
ta
lis
at
io
n,
 lo
w
 in
co
m
e 
le
ve
l 
an
d 
liv
in
g 
w
ith
 a
 m
em
be
r w
ith
 a
 c
hr
on
ic
 
ill
ne
ss
. 
Ilu
ng
a-
Ilu
ng
a 
et
 a
l.,
20
14
 
D
em
oc
ra
tic
 
R
ep
ub
lic
 o
f 
C
on
go
 
D
is
tri
ct
 
pa
tie
nt
  
su
rv
ey
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
B
iv
ar
ia
te
 a
nd
 
M
ul
tiv
ar
ia
te
 
lo
gi
st
ic
 
an
al
ys
is
   
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
in
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 H
H
 li
vi
ng
 
st
an
da
rd
s;
 s
ex
 o
f H
H
 h
ea
d;
 
ne
ur
ol
og
ic
al
 c
om
pl
ic
at
io
n;
 ty
pe
 o
f 
re
co
ur
se
. 
Fa
ct
or
s 
fo
un
d 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 C
H
E
 w
er
e 
lo
w
 H
H
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
of
 li
vi
ng
; f
em
al
e 
H
H
 
he
ad
; n
eu
ro
lo
gi
ca
l c
om
pl
ic
at
io
n 
an
d 
in
di
re
ct
 re
co
ur
se
 (p
re
-h
os
pi
ta
l t
re
at
m
en
t).
 
K
na
ul
 
et
 
al
.,2
01
1 
M
ul
ti-
co
un
tr
y 
N
at
io
na
l 
su
rv
ey
s.
  
N
on
-
su
bs
is
te
nc
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
C
om
pa
re
d 
su
b-
gr
ou
ps
 
w
ith
in
 e
ac
h 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
S
ub
-g
ro
up
s 
in
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
 
Fa
ct
or
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 C
H
E
s:
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N
=1
2 
 
La
tin
 a
nd
 
C
ar
ib
be
an
  
co
un
tri
es
 
(2
00
0-
20
07
).
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
co
un
tr
y 
by
 th
e 
fa
ct
or
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 in
cu
rr
in
g 
ca
ta
st
ro
ph
ic
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
  
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
H
H
 in
co
m
e;
 H
H
 s
iz
e;
 lo
ca
tio
n;
 
he
al
th
 in
su
ra
nc
e;
 H
H
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
 
B
ei
ng
 ru
ra
l; 
lo
w
 in
co
m
e;
 s
m
al
l f
am
ily
 s
iz
e;
 
la
ck
 o
f i
ns
ur
an
ce
;  
 
La
ra
 
&
 
G
om
ez
 
(2
00
9)
 
B
og
ot
a,
 
C
ol
um
bi
a 
N
at
io
na
l 
su
rv
ey
, 
H
ea
lth
 
S
er
vi
ce
s 
U
se
 &
 
E
xp
en
di
tu
r
e 
su
rv
ey
. 
(2
00
1)
 
N
on
-
su
bs
is
te
nc
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
  
P
ro
bi
t b
in
ar
y 
re
sp
on
se
 
m
od
el
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
In
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
H
H
 in
co
m
e;
 H
H
 s
iz
e;
 d
is
ab
ili
ty
; 
H
H
 h
ea
d 
(s
ex
; a
ge
; e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
st
at
us
); 
H
H
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
st
at
us
; t
yp
e 
of
 h
ea
lth
 c
ar
e 
co
ns
um
ed
. 
Fa
ct
or
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 C
H
E
s 
H
H
 s
iz
e 
of
 1
or
 2
 p
er
so
ns
; b
ei
ng
 
un
in
su
re
d;
 la
ck
in
g 
fo
rm
al
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t; 
in
pa
tie
nt
 c
ar
e 
an
d 
lo
w
 in
co
m
e.
 
   
Li
 e
t a
l.,
 
(2
01
2)
 
C
hi
na
 
N
at
io
na
l 
su
rv
ey
. 
Fo
ur
th
 
N
at
io
na
l 
H
ea
lth
 
S
er
vi
ce
 
S
ur
ve
y.
 
(2
00
8)
 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 
no
n-
su
bs
is
te
nc
e 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
  
Lo
gi
st
ic
 
re
gr
es
si
on
  
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
In
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
E
du
ca
tio
n 
le
ve
l; 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
st
at
us
 o
f H
H
 h
ea
d;
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
st
at
us
 o
f t
he
 H
H
 h
ea
d;
 H
H
 
m
em
be
r l
iv
in
g 
w
ith
 a
 c
hr
on
ic
 
di
se
as
e;
 in
co
m
e 
le
ve
l a
nd
 
lo
ca
tio
n.
 
Fa
ct
or
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 H
H
s 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
of
 
in
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
w
er
e 
no
 e
du
ca
tio
n;
 
ch
ro
ni
c 
co
nd
iti
on
s;
 h
os
pi
ta
lis
at
io
n;
 a
ge
 
60
+ 
ye
ar
s;
 tu
be
rc
ul
os
is
; b
ei
ng
 ru
ra
l a
nd
 
fe
m
al
e 
an
d 
be
in
g 
po
or
. 
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M
in
h 
et
 a
l.,
 
(2
01
2)
 
V
ie
tn
am
 
N
at
io
na
l 
su
rv
ey
, 
Li
vi
ng
 
S
ta
nd
ar
d 
S
ur
ve
y,
  
(2
00
2-
20
10
).
 
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
 
lo
gi
st
ic
 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
an
al
ys
is
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
in
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
st
at
us
, H
H
-h
ea
d 
ge
nd
er
, H
H
 s
iz
e,
 
lo
ca
tio
n,
 in
co
m
e 
le
ve
l, 
H
H
 w
ith
 
ch
ild
re
n.
  
S
m
al
l H
H
 s
iz
e;
 H
H
 m
em
be
r o
f a
ge
 <
6 
ye
ar
s 
an
d 
60
+ 
ye
ar
s;
 u
ni
ns
ur
ed
, b
ei
ng
 
po
or
 a
nd
 b
ei
ng
 ru
ra
l. 
 
 
N
gu
ye
n,
 
R
aj
ko
tia
 
&
 
W
an
g 
(2
01
1)
 
G
ha
na
 
(N
ko
ra
nz
a 
&
 O
ffi
ns
o)
. 
D
is
tri
ct
 
su
rv
ey
. 
(2
00
7)
 
In
co
m
e 
an
d 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 
P
ro
bi
t m
od
el
  
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
In
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
H
H
 h
ea
d 
(e
du
ca
tio
n,
 o
cc
up
at
io
n,
 
an
d 
ge
nd
er
); 
ch
ro
ni
c 
he
al
th
 
co
nd
iti
on
; H
H
 s
iz
e;
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
st
at
us
 in
co
m
e 
le
ve
l. 
Fa
ct
or
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 C
H
E
 w
er
e 
na
m
el
y;
 B
ei
ng
 fe
m
al
e 
H
H
 h
ea
d 
w
ith
 n
o 
or
 
le
ss
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
lo
w
 in
co
m
e.
 
B
ei
ng
 in
su
re
d 
w
as
 fo
un
d 
to
 b
e 
pr
ot
ec
tiv
e 
ag
ai
ns
t C
H
E
s.
 
O
’D
on
ne
ll 
et
 
al
.,2
00
5 
B
an
gl
ad
es
h 
H
on
g 
K
on
g,
 
In
di
a,
 S
ri 
La
nk
a,
 
T
ha
ila
nd
 
an
d 
V
ie
tn
am
. 
N
at
io
na
l 
an
d 
pr
ov
in
ci
al
 
su
rv
ey
s.
 
(1
99
8-
20
00
).
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
P
ro
bi
t a
na
ly
si
s 
w
as
 u
se
d 
to
 
ex
am
in
e 
fa
ct
or
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 H
H
 
vu
ln
er
ab
ili
ty
 to
 
fin
an
ci
al
 ri
sk
. 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
in
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
H
ea
lth
 in
su
ra
nc
e;
 lo
ca
tio
n;
 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
si
ze
 a
nd
 c
om
po
si
tio
n;
 
H
H
-h
ea
d 
(a
ge
, s
ex
, e
du
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t) 
st
at
us
. 
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 o
f C
H
E
s:
 
B
ei
ng
 ru
ra
l; 
po
or
 li
vi
ng
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 e
.g
., 
po
or
 s
an
ita
tio
n;
 la
ck
 o
f i
ns
ur
an
ce
 a
nd
 la
ck
 
of
 in
su
ra
nc
e.
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S
ak
se
na
, 
S
m
ith
 
&
 
T
ed
io
si
 
(2
01
4)
 
M
ul
ti-
co
un
tr
y,
 
N
=5
1 
co
un
tri
es
 
 N
at
io
na
l 
st
ud
y,
 
(W
or
ld
 
H
ea
lth
 
S
ur
ve
y-
(2
00
0-
20
03
) 
  
N
on
-
su
bs
is
te
nc
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
m
ul
ti-
le
ve
l 
m
od
el
lin
g 
 
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 H
ou
se
ho
ld
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
in
g 
fin
an
ci
al
 h
ar
ds
hi
p.
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 le
ve
l: 
A
ge
; h
ou
se
ho
ld
 
w
ith
 a
 m
em
be
r l
iv
in
g 
w
ith
 
di
sa
bi
lit
y;
 e
du
ca
tio
n 
le
ve
l o
f H
H
 
he
ad
 s
ex
 a
nd
 e
du
ca
tio
na
l s
ta
tu
s;
 
re
si
de
nc
e 
(u
rb
an
/ru
ra
l) 
an
d 
in
su
ra
nc
e 
st
at
us
.  
N
at
io
na
l l
ev
el
: t
ot
al
 h
ea
lth
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 p
er
 c
ap
ita
; 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f o
ut
-o
f-
po
ck
et
 
pa
ym
en
ts
 a
s 
a 
sh
ar
e 
of
 to
ta
l 
he
al
th
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
; g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
on
 h
ea
lth
 a
s 
a 
sh
ar
e 
of
 to
ta
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t e
xp
en
di
tu
re
; 
pr
ep
ay
m
en
t f
in
an
ci
ng
 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
(a
 ta
x-
ba
se
d;
 m
ix
ed
 
sy
st
em
 o
r s
oc
ia
l h
ea
lth
 
In
su
ra
nc
e-
ba
se
d 
sy
st
em
).
 
V
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
ha
rd
sh
ip
: 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 le
ve
l 
B
ei
ng
 a
n 
el
de
rly
 a
ge
 6
0+
 y
ea
rs
 o
r c
hi
ld
re
n 
<5
 y
ea
rs
; h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
w
ith
 a
 m
em
be
r 
liv
in
g 
w
ith
 a
 d
is
ab
ili
ty
; b
ei
ng
 ru
ra
l; 
po
or
 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
; l
ow
 le
ve
l o
f e
du
ca
tio
n 
by
 th
e 
H
H
-h
ea
d 
(le
ss
 th
an
 s
ec
on
da
ry
) a
nd
 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 h
ea
lth
 in
su
ra
nc
e.
  
N
at
io
na
l l
ev
el
: 
T
he
 s
ha
re
 o
f o
ut
-o
f-
po
ck
et
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 in
 
to
ta
l h
ea
lth
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 w
as
 fo
un
d 
as
 a
 
ke
y-
ro
bu
st
 in
di
ca
to
r (
pr
ox
y)
 fo
r f
in
an
ci
al
 
ha
rd
sh
ip
. 
Le
ve
l o
f i
ne
qu
al
ity
 in
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 (m
ea
su
re
d 
us
in
g 
G
in
i 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 o
f H
H
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
) a
ls
o 
ha
d 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 c
at
as
tro
ph
e.
 
S
en
e 
&
 
C
is
se
 (2
01
5)
  
S
en
eg
al
 
N
at
io
na
l 
su
rv
ey
. 
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
 
T
ob
it 
re
gr
es
si
on
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
in
cu
rr
in
g 
C
H
E
s 
 
Fa
ct
or
s 
fo
un
d 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 C
H
E
 w
er
e 
na
m
el
y:
 e
ld
er
ly
 5
0+
 y
ea
rs
; c
hi
ld
re
n 
be
lo
w
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P
ov
er
ty
 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
su
rv
ey
. 
(2
01
1)
. 
(th
at
 in
vo
lv
es
 
ce
ns
or
in
g 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 
m
ix
ed
-p
ro
ce
ss
 
es
tim
at
or
 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
in
 
or
de
r t
o 
ac
co
un
t f
or
 
th
os
e 
w
ho
 
ut
ili
se
d 
w
ith
ou
t 
pa
yi
ng
 fo
r t
he
 
se
rv
ic
es
).
 
In
de
pe
nd
en
t v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 
U
til
is
at
io
n 
of
 h
ea
lth
 c
ar
e;
 lo
ca
tio
n;
 
H
H
 h
ea
d 
(s
ex
, a
ge
 a
nd
 le
ve
l o
f 
ed
uc
at
io
n)
; I
lln
es
s 
se
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2.4 Discussion of the evidence reviewed 
 
The level of catastrophic health expenditure and its impoverishment effects have been 
widely applied in assessing and drawing attention to the financial protection status in 
countries (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003; Xu et al., 2003; Xu et al.,2007). 
 
In the assessment of catastrophic health expenditure, studies defined catastrophe either 
both in terms of total or non-food household expenditure (capacity to pay13). However, 
the two measures often yielded different results. The indices by the non-food approach 
tend to be higher than the total expenditure based measures (Séne & Cissé, 2015; 
Ataguba, 2012; Chuma & Maina, 2012; Bredenkamp, Mendola & Gragnolati, 2011; 
Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). Similarly, studies that employed income as an indicator 
of household welfare also reported higher estimates on average compared to 
consumption measures (Arsenijevic, Pavlova & Groot, 2013; Nguyen, Rajkotia & Wang, 
2011). The latter difference may not be completely surprising as Deaton, (2002) asserted 
that income is likely to be underreported particularly in countries in which employment is 
largely informal, thus most individuals may appear to have far lesser resources (low 
income) compared to consumption levels hence the higher estimates of catastrophe with 
income. In another sense, this discrepancy seems to support the argument that the 
distribution of catastrophic health expenditure to a certain extent depends on the 
households’ welfare indicator applied as well as the approach employed in defining 
catastrophic payments (total (non-food) expenditure/income).  
 
Furthermore, this could partly explain the variation in findings by studies (Wagstaff et al., 
2011; O'Donnell et al., 2008; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003; Xu et al., 2003). It is 
however, important to note that while the estimates by these two measures (total and 
non-food expenditure) appear to yield different results, they were observed as consistent 
in meaning. For instance, applying the two approaches (total and non-food expenditure) 
in a particular population, it is less likely that one approach could report absence of 
catastrophe and have the other reporting otherwise (Arsenijevic, Pavlova & Groot, 2013). 
This could be due to the underlying assumptions which remains similar for both 
                                                          
 
 
13 Total consumption expenditure net subsistence food expenditure. 
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measures which is; health payment displacing household spending on essential non-
medical goods and also being non-discretionary (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). 
 
On another hand, there have been studies that have sought to incorporate the principle 
of vertical equity in the assessment of catastrophic health expenditure by modifying the 
conventional methodology proposed by Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, (2003) and applied a 
variable threshold (Ataguba, 2012; Onoka et al., 2011). The method by Ataguba, (2012) 
allowed catastrophe to be a function of where one sits in the income distribution range 
and its does not require distributional sensitive measures as that by Onoka, (2011). 
However, evidence by both studies was consistent in suggesting that the uniform 
threshold approach may under report the incidence of catastrophic health expenditures 
compared to the varying threshold (Onoka, 2011; Ataguba.2012). The method proposed 
by Ataguba (2012) has been further applied elsewhere and the findings further support 
the argument by Onoka, (2011) and Ataguba, (2012) (Kwesiga, 2012). 
 
With respect to levels of catastrophe, evidence showed that households do spend a 
greater portion of their income on health care and that includes both in advanced and 
developing economies (Xu et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2003). However, the extent and severity 
of catastrophe varied by countries’ income levels and further by population groups within 
the countries (Séne & Cissé, 2015; Arsenijevic, Pavlova & Groot, 2013; Chuma & Maina, 
2012; Mills et al., 2012; Bredenkamp, Mendola & Gragnolati, 2011; Akazili, 2010; Su, 
Kouyaté & Flessa, 2006; O’Donnell et al., 2005; Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003; Xu et 
al., 2003). It was further evident that catastrophic health expenditure is disproportionally 
more among households in the lower expenditure quintile, particularly in developing 
countries compared to the developed (Xu et al., 2003; Xu et., 2007; van Doorslaer, 
2007). This implied that the poor suffer more than the rich (Chuma & Maina, 2012; 
Ataguba, 2012; Mills et al., 2012; Yardim, Cilingiroglu & Yardim, 2010; Xu et al., 2007; 
Su, Kouyaté & Flessa, 2006). For example, a cross-country analysis of 89 countries 
revealed that about 3% of households in low-income countries incur catastrophe while 
there were about 1.8% in the middle income and only 0.6% in advanced economies (Xu 
et al ., 2007). Evidence appears to suggest a number of reasons for the latter, but a 
plausible explanation was that by Xu et al (2003), stating that advanced economies have 
well-established social institutions such as social insurances compared to their 
counterparts with little or non-existent insurance. This evidence was further supported 
by O’ Donnell et al., (2005). 
In the case of impoverishment, evidence showed that out-of-pocket health care 
payments do not only compromise households’ standard of living by pushing households 
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below the poverty line (extent) but they can also deepen poverty levels amongst 
households that were previously poor before health spending (intensity) (Van Minh et al., 
2013; Kwesiga, 2012; Mills et al., 2012). However, the burden was particularly heavy 
among poor households (Mills et al., 2012; Knaul et al., 2011; van Doorslaer et al., 2007). 
For example, Mills et al., (2012) found that in South Africa, the rise in poverty as a result 
of health payments was mainly as a result of previously non-poor households brought 
into poverty while in Ghana and Tanzania it was mainly the already poor households that 
deepened into poverty.  
 
Similarly, Bredenkamp, Mendola & Gragnolati, (2010), found that in Albania the 
impoverishing effects were in extremes in both terms (intensity and extent) followed by 
Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and less so in Montenegro. It was further observed that studies 
conducted in Africa had the impoverishing effects more in terms of deepening of poverty 
levels of the already poor (Akazili, 2010; Chuma & Maina, 2012; Kwesiga, Zikusooka & 
Ataguba, 2015). These findings seem to support the idea that the impoverishment effects 
of out-of-pocket health care payment tend to mirror the poverty situation in a country and 
emphasizes the poverty effects among the poor groups (Arsenijevic, Pavlova & Groot, 
2012). On another hand, the evidence clearly showed that the extent and intensity of 
catastrophe and impoverishment vary across households suggesting that some 
households have a greater propensity to suffer financial risk as a result of out-of-pocket 
payments than others (Xu et al., 2007). 
 
With respect to factors associated with financial risk, studies found that households’ 
structures, in terms of both household-head characteristics and demographic 
composition were associated with households facing financial risk. Households of low-
socio-economic status, rural, and household head with no or poor (educational or 
employment) status indicated a greater propensity for financial risk (Ukwaja et al., 2013; 
Saksena et al., 2011; Ruhweza et al., 2009; Castillo-Riquelme, McIntyre & Barnes, 
2008). These findings were consistent with the Grossman model of demand for health 
care which posits that the educated are efficient producers of health and therefore less 
vulnerable to financial risk compared to the less educated. Endorsing this evidence 
further, is the argument that living in a rural area is associated with less education and 
so is poverty as well as high disease burden (WHO, 2010; O’ Donnel et al.,2005). Whilst 
evidence from a majority of the empirical work supported the latter argument, there is 
contrasting evidence by Samkotra & Lagrada (2009) suggesting that in advanced 
economies the risk of households facing financial hardships tend to be more among the 
rich than among the poor. This evidence also supports the argument that catastrophic 
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health expenditure is associated with the use of private health care (Abu-Zaineh et al., 
2013; Su, Kouyaté & Flessa, 2006). 
 
Household size was another factor found to predict the likelihood of households suffering 
financial risks; however the evidence was inconsistent with regard to this finding. Some 
studies reported household size greater than five as associated with households facing 
financial risk (Kronenberg & Barros, 2014; Yardim, Cilingiroglu & Yardim, 2010; Knaul et 
al., 2011). However, Lara & Gomez (2009) found larger household size as protective 
against financial risk. A plausible explanation for the divergent outcome could be that 
relationships between household size and financial risk is to a greater extent determined 
by how each household member impacts on household resources as a whole (Maredza, 
2009). For example, a household with largely economically active members has more 
disposable resources and thus faces lesser risk of incurring financial hardship than a 
household having economically inactive members regardless of size. This line of thought 
is further supported by Minh et al., (2012). 
 
Furthermore, the elderly aged 60+ years and children <5years were found to be 
associated with household vulnerability to financial risks (Saksena et al., 2011; Ruhweza 
et al., 2009). However, other studies found that this group has a protective effect 
particularly children (Yardim, Cilingiroglu & Yardim, 2010). Xu et al., (2007) however 
found no association. There have been a number of theories put forth to explain this 
observation. Habibov (2009), argues that these groups are economically inactive yet 
consume more services. Whereas those in support of the protective effect assert that 
children and elderly have access to free health care services and social grants in some 
countries (Yardim, Cilingiroglu & Yardim, 2010). However, the latter argument is likely to 
be less applicable in many developing countries where services are largely paid for 
regardless of the age group (WHO, 2010). 
 
Another large body of evidence assessed financial risk in relation to the availability of 
health insurances. Most of the empirical work appears to support the notion that 
prepayment financing mechanisms do offer households protection against financial risks, 
however the level appears to depend on how these mechanisms are organised within 
countries (Limwattananon et al., 2015; McIntyre & Meheus, 2013; Saksena et al., 2011; 
Nguyen, Rajkotia & Wang, 2011). For example, mandatory prepayment mechanisms 
offer greater protection against financial risk compared to private voluntary insurance 
(McIntyre, 2007). On the contrary, evidence by Ekman (2007) in Zambia illustrated that 
being insured was associated with increased likelihood of incurring catastrophic health 
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costs. This finding was similar to that found elsewhere (Abu-Zaineh et al., 2013; Barros, 
Bastos & Damaso, 2011; Knaul et al., 2011). However, it was noted that these studies 
only considered private insurances; meaning they did not look at other form of insurances 
such as mandatory insurance. Thus, these findings may not be generalised. Generally, 
however, the evidence could be seen as shedding light on the matter (insurance) and 
perhaps emphasising that the type of insurance matters in financial protection. 
 
2.5  Conclusions 
 
Catastrophic health expenditure and its impoverishing effects exist across countries but 
the consequences are more severe among low income countries compared to advanced 
economies. The distribution differs further with households’ income level within countries 
indicating that some households have a greater propensity to suffer financial risk than 
others. The poor tend to bear a greater burden of direct health care payment than the 
rich as they contribute more in terms of budget share. While the poor seems to be the 
most at risk, it is clear that even the better-offs could still be drawn into poverty as a result 
of catastrophic health care payments. Also, even though a causal relationship cannot be 
drawn from the evidence because of the observational nature of the studies reviewed, it 
is evident that catastrophic health expenditure is associated with households’ financial 
hardship especially among poorer households within countries. 
 
Finally, there are a number of important lessons and gaps that emerged from the review. 
The assessment of financial health protection in developing countries like Swaziland is 
limited. The few previous studies, particularly in Africa, mostly examined catastrophe and 
the predisposing factors and left out impoverishment. This does not give a complete 
picture of the financial hardship caused to households by direct out-of-pocket payments. 
In addition, only a limited number of studies assessing catastrophe conducted in Africa 
used nationally representative surveys. This is a challenge as countries’ estimates 
cannot be drawn from such evidence, and without which it would be difficult for countries 
to understand the performance of their health systems in protecting individuals and 
households against unduly financial hurt as a result of out-of-pocket health care 
payments. Lastly, the application of the variable threshold in the assessment of 
catastrophe was found limited with only two studies conducted in Nigeria and Uganda 
(Ataguba, 2012; Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015). 
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Assessment of financial catastrophe and impoverishment from out-of-pocket 
payments in Swaziland 
Abstract:  
As the drive towards universal coverage is gaining momentum globally, the need for 
assessing levels of financial health protection in countries, particularity the developing 
world, has increasingly become important. Swaziland’s health financing system 
performance in terms of ensuring financial health protection is not clearly understood. 
This paper assesses financial catastrophe and impoverishment from out-of-pocket 
payments and associated factors that predict them in Swaziland. The Swaziland 
Household Income and Expenditure Survey (SHIES) for 2009/2010 was used for the 
analyses. Financial catastrophe was assessed using a variable threshold. 
Impoverishment was assessed using both a national and $1.25/day international poverty 
line. Logistic regression models were used to assess factors that predict household 
vulnerability to financial catastrophe and impoverishment. It emerged that about 9.6 per 
cent of the Swazi households experienced financial catastrophe while about 1.1 per cent 
were pushed below the poverty line as a result of out-of-pocket payments. Factors 
associated with households’ vulnerability include; education of the household-head, 
household size, location, age and household socio-economic status. The findings 
indicate that financial health protection is not adequate in Swaziland. Thus, there is a 
need for financing mechanisms that do not place undue hardships on the poor and 
vulnerable. 
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Introduction 
 
The call to countries to aim for universal health coverage by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) has seen financial health protection becoming a priority, 
particularly, but not exclusively, among low-and middle income countries (WHO, 2010). 
The World Health Organization has defined Universal Health Coverage (UHC) as 
ensuring that all people obtain the health services they need, which should be of good 
quality without suffering financial hardship when paying for them (WHO, 2010). Among 
others, attaining UHC requires a well-functioning health financing system (McIntyre, 
2007). It is the health financing system that determines if people can have access to care 
without experiencing exorbitant out-of-pocket payments (Brearly, Marten & O’Connell, 
2013; WHO, 2010). One of the mechanisms for financing health services is out-of-pocket 
payments (WHO, 2010). However, this mechanism has negative consequences on 
households’ welfare particularly for the low income groups (McIntyre et al., 2006; 
Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003; Wagstaff, 2002; Whitehead, Dahlgren & Evans, 2001). 
The poor suffer the most mainly because they bear the greatest disease burden 
(Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 2003). Also, they spend a greater share of their income on 
food, and thus they are prone to financial hurt even by health care payments that may 
appear modest (Su, Kouyaté & Flessa, 2006). The major negative consequences of out-
of-pocket payments include impoverishment and financial catastrophe. 
 
Out-of-pocket payments are considered catastrophic if they exceed a certain fraction of 
a household’s income. This fraction is assumed as the maximum health costs that could 
be spent without disrupting the household’s standard of living (Wagstaff & van Doorslaer, 
2003). As a result of catastrophic health payments households forgo spending on basic 
necessities like food (O'Donnell et al., 2008; McIntyre et al., 2006). In addition, some 
households incur debts or even sell productive assets to cope with the payments (Leive 
& Xu, 2008). Sadly, these coping mechanisms are never sufficient to protect households’ 
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welfare from being disrupted by such costs. Consequently, households may be pushed 
into poverty or further into poverty for those that are already poor (Whitehead, Dahlgren 
& Evans, 2001). The detrimental effects of out-of-pocket payments are evident, 
particularly in developing countries (Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015; Chuma & 
Maina, 2012; Flores et al., 2008). However, many countries still struggle to lower their 
levels of out-of-pocket payments to negligible levels of 15-20 per cent as per WHO 
recommendations (McIntyre & Meheus, 2014; Sambo, Kirigia & Orem, 2013). Among the 
widely recognised hindrances to households protection against the catastrophic and 
impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket payments includes lack of evidence on the health 
financing systems performance including financial health protection1 within countries 
(WHO, 2010). Evidence of the health financing systems performance is key to inform 
and guide interventions aimed at addressing the financial protection challenges faced by 
countries (Sambo & Kirigia, 2014; Knaul et al., 2007). Thus, there is a need to understand 
health financing systems performance by measuring the levels of households 
experiencing catastrophe and impoverishment as a result of out-of-pocket payments, 
and also, to examine the related factors. 
 
Swaziland’s health financing system consists of tax payments (estimated to constitute 
18 per cent of the total expenditure on health) whilst for profit private health insurances, 
donors and out-of-pocket payment constitute about 19, 22 and 11 per cent respectively 
(WHO, 2015b; Mathauer et al., 2008). The government health spending as a percentage 
of GDP is estimated at 6 per cent whilst about 30 per cent of this is private health 
expenditure (WHO, 2012). 
 
In Swaziland, 11 per cent as the share of out-of-pocket payments in total health 
expenditure could be regarded as modest relative to those of other low-income countries, 
mostly in Africa (WHO, 2015b ; WHO, 2013). However, there have been special cases 
whereby other countries reported fair health spending levels but still lack adequate 
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financial health protection for their population (McIntyre & Meheus, 2014). Similar 
concerns are held about Swaziland particularly because there is limited evidence on how 
the current health financing systems is adequately ensuring financial health protection 
which has a bearing on equal access to health care across segments of the population 
in Swaziland.  
 
Furthermore, to the knowledge of the author, there has not been a study conducted 
before assessing the levels of financial catastrophe and its impoverishment effects on 
households in the country. Thus, this study intends to provide evidence in this regard to 
guide health financing policy in Swaziland. In addition, the study also examined factors 
associated with households’ vulnerability to catastrophe and impoverishment. 
 
Methodology  
 
The data used in the study were from the Swaziland Household Income and Expenditure 
Survey (SHIES) 2009-2010. The SHIES is a multi-purpose survey conducted on a 
nationwide basis by the Central Statistical Office of Swaziland (CSO). Out-of-pocket 
expenditure data include both inpatient and outpatient out-of-pocket payments collected 
over 1 month period. But for the purposes of reporting annual effects of out-of-pocket 
payments the expenditure data were annualized (multiplied by 12 months) in the 
analysis. Households were selected based on a two-stage stratified sampling method. 
In the first stage, 375 enumeration areas (EAs) were selected with probability 
proportional to size based on the 2007 population census framework. At the second 
stage, within each EA, a fixed number of households were selected by systematic 
random sampling method. The final sample size was 3167 households from which 1378 
were urban and 1794 rural (CSO, 2011). 
 
Living standards and out-of-pocket measurement 
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The household living standard was estimated using total consumption as a proxy for 
income. Consumption is the most preferred measure due to a number of reasons among 
which is that, it is stable across time, thus it is more reliable compared to income (Deaton 
and Zaidi 2002). Adult equivalent scale (AE) was used to adjust expenditure 
(consumption and out-of-pocket) to reflect per adult equivalent consumption. This 
method has been used elsewhere (Ataguba & McIntyre, 2012), and is defined as:  
                                                                                     equation (1) 
 
𝐴𝐸 = (𝑠𝐴 + ΦS𝐾)
𝜃 for θ ⩾ 0, 0 ⩽  Φ ⩽ 1                                                                  
 
where 𝑠𝐴 is the number of adults in the household; 𝑆𝐾 is the number of children, 𝚽 is the 
cost of children (a measure of the weight accorded to children relative to adults) and θ 
represents economies of scale. Following recommendations by Deaton and Zaidi (2002), 
the following values were set; 𝚽 = 0.5 and θ = 0.75. 
Out-of-pocket payments included all direct costs made by households to formal or 
informal health care providers in order to access health care services that were not 
reimbursed by any prepayment scheme. 
 
Assessing financial protection in a health system 
The argument underlying the assessment of financial protection is that households and 
individuals ought not to experience financial hardship as a result of health care utilisation, 
and this is one of the functions of the health systems (WHO 2010). 
The catastrophic and impoverishment methodologies have been used to assess the level 
of financial health protection in a health system (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003). 
When assessing financial catastrophe, households ought not to spend in excess of a 
given fraction (z percent) of their total expenditure on health care out-of-pocket. The 
methodology by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer uses a fixed threshold for all households 
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regardless of different income levels. It is argued that z should be increasing 
(e.g.,variable) with income such that financial catastrophe is a function of where a 
household sits in the income ranking (Ataguba, 2012). To achieve the latter, Ataguba, 
(2012) proposes assessing financial catastrophe using variable thresholds. This method 
uses a parameter of aversion to inequality to derive rank dependent thresholds such that 
low-income households are subject to a lower percentage compared to their high-income 
counterparts. This is consistent with the principle of vertical equity (e.g., equitable 
treatment of unequals) (Ataguba 2012).  
 
Furthermore, this methodology recognises that poor households are likely to experience 
financial hurt even from small payments. This study therefore adopts the methodology 
proposed in Ataguba (2012) for assessing catastrophe. This method has also been 
applied elsewhere recently (Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015). 
 
The catastrophic effects of out-of-pocket payments 
Rank-dependent financial catastrophe 
If 𝑦 is total household income, 𝑇𝑖  is a household total out-of-pocket payments and 𝑍𝑐𝑎𝑡 
is an initial threshold, then a rank dependent threshold 𝑍′𝑐𝑎𝑡 can be defined as:      (2) 
   𝑍′𝑐𝑎𝑡 = 𝑤(𝑝: 𝑦) ∗ 𝑍𝑐𝑎𝑡 
where 𝑦 is a parameter of aversion to inequality, 𝑝 is a household’s percentile and 
𝑤(𝑝: 𝑦) = 𝑦 (1 − 𝑝)𝑦−1 for 𝑦 ∈ (0,1] when 𝑦 = 1,  𝑍′𝑐𝑎𝑡 = 𝑍𝑐𝑎𝑡.              (3) 
 Note that in this study, following the Ataguba (2012), 𝑦 = 0.8 for initial thresholds 5, 10, 
15, 20 and 25 per cent of total household income. 
Let 𝑂𝑖
′  represents the rank dependent catastrophic overshoot which is the excess 
payment above threshold such that: 
 𝑂𝑖
′ = max  (0, (𝑇𝑖 𝑦𝑖⁄ ) − 𝑍′𝑐𝑎𝑡).                              (4) 
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If 𝐸𝑖
′ is a measure indicating whether a household exceeds the rank dependent threshold, 
then 𝐸𝑖
′ = 1  when 𝑂𝑖
′ > 0  and zero otherwise. Then the rank-dependent headcount is 
estimated as:                              (5) 
𝐻′𝑐𝑎𝑡 = 𝑁
−1  (∑ 𝐸′
𝑖
𝑁
𝑖  =1
) = 𝜇′𝐸′ 
where 𝜇′𝐸′ is the mean of 𝐸′𝑖 and N is the total sample size. This measure indicates the 
percentage of households whose out-of-pocket payments as a fraction of their income 
exceed the rank dependent threshold. 
 
Rank-dependent catastrophic gap 
The rank-dependent catastrophic gap (𝐺𝑐𝑎𝑡′ ), captures deviations from the catastrophic 
threshold (𝑍𝑐𝑎𝑡′ ) across all the observations in the quantiles of gross income irrespective 
of their health payments. The rank-dependent catastrophic gap index is computed as:
               (6) 
𝐺′𝑐𝑎𝑡 = 𝑁
−1  (∑ 𝑂′𝑖
𝑁
𝑖  =1
) = 𝜇′𝑂′ 
Where 𝜇′𝑂′ is the mean of 𝑂
′
𝑖
 (mean of overshoots) 
 
Mean positive rank dependent gap 
The mean positive rank dependent gap (𝑃𝐺𝑐𝑎𝑡′ ) indicates the average payment excess 
made only by those households with catastrophic health expenditures. The index is 
computed as:                (7) 
𝑃𝐺′𝑐𝑎𝑡 =
∑ 𝑂′
𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐸′
𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 𝜇
′
𝑜′
𝜇
′
𝐸′
⁄  
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Worth mentioning is that following what others have done (Akazili, 2012; Ataguba 2012), 
the catastrophic effects of out-of-pocket payments is assessed using both total food and 
total non-food expenditure approaches. However, this is not for comparison purposes 
given that these approaches apply different thresholds levels. 
The impoverishing effects of out-of-pocket payments 
The impoverishment effect of out-of-pocket is indicated by the proportion of individuals 
pushed below the poverty line as a result of paying out-of-pocket for health care 
(Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003).  
 
Pre-payment poverty headcount 
If 𝑧𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 = pre-payment poverty line and 𝑥𝑖  = individuals 𝑖′𝑠 pre-payment income, then 
define 𝑃𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒 = 1 if  𝑥𝑖 < 𝑧𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒. The pre-payment poverty hadcount is estimated as:       (8) 
𝐻𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 𝜇𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒 
where N is the sample size. 
 
Pre-payment poverty gap 
The poverty gap (𝑔𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒
) indicates short fall from the poverty line. Also, the poverty gap 
can be seen as the costs for eliminating poverty per head relative to the poverty line. 
This is equal to 𝑥𝑖 −  𝑧𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 if 𝑥𝑖 < 𝑧𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒, and zero otherwise. The associated pre-payment 
poverty gap is defined as:             (9) 
𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑁
𝑖=1
= 𝜇𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒 
 
Normalized pre-payment poverty gap 
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The normalized pre-payment poverty gap estimates the amount required to bring those 
impoverished above the poverty line. This index is estimated as:       (10) 
𝑁𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 =
𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒  
Mean positive prepayment poverty gap 
The mean positive prepayment poverty gap indicates intensity as it shows the average 
deficit to reach the poverty line only among the poor. This index is estimated as:     (11) 
𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 = ∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑁
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑝𝑖
𝑝𝑟𝑒
𝑁
𝑖=1
⁄ =  𝜇𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑒 𝜇𝑃𝑝𝑟𝑒⁄  
 
To obtain post-payment indices which are analogous to the pre-payment indices, the 
pre-payment poverty line 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 is replaced by the post-payment poverty line 𝑍𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 and all 
other superscripts ‘𝑝𝑟𝑒’ by the superscript ‘𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡’. 
 
Then the poverty impact of out-of-pocket payment is defined as the difference between 
the relevant pre-payment and post-payment measures shown below: 
Impoverishment head count is calculated as;                    (12) 
 𝑃𝐼𝐻 = 𝐻𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐻𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒  
Impoverishment gap as;            (13) 
 𝑃𝐼𝐺 = 𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒 
Normalized impoverishment gap as;                     (14) 
 𝑃𝐼𝑁𝐺 = 𝑁𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑁𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒  
Mean positive gap as;            (15) 
 
 𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑁𝐺 = 𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝑀𝑃𝐺𝑝𝑜𝑣
𝑝𝑟𝑒. 
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In this study poverty was computed using national (E461 per person/per month) and 
international ($1.25/day) poverty lines. The international poverty line was computed 
using the 2010 power purchasing parity (PPP) conversion factor of $1= E4.7 calculated 
based on the Global Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures by The World 
Bank (World Bank 2008). 
 
Household level factors associated with financial catastrophe and 
impoverishment 
 
Factors associated with a household incurring catastrophic payments and 
impoverishment were determined using multivariate logistic regression as used in Knaul 
et al. (2007). The model is specified as:         (16) 
𝐼𝑛 [
𝜋(𝑥)
1 − 𝜋(𝑥)
] = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖 
 
Where 𝜋(𝑥) is the probability that the response variable (catastrophic payment or 
impoverishment) 𝑌𝑖 = 1; 𝛼 is the constant and 𝛽 are the coefficient of the predictor 
variables (𝑥). 
 
Independent variables  
 
The independent variables explored in this study were selected based on previous 
studies (Séne & Cissé, 2015; Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015; Su, Kouyaté & 
Flessa, 2006; Xu et al., 2003) (see Table 4). The factors included a range of household 
(income level, household size and location), household-head (sex, employment status 
and educational level) and individual related factors e.g., age. 
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Further, since household consumption was used as a measure for household ability to 
pay, in order to examine any correlation between household living standards and 
impoverishment from health payments an asset index was constructed. The asset index 
was generated using principal component analysis (PCA) based on indicators of 
households’ characteristics and assets ownership, e.g., source of drinking water, toilet 
facility, and car, television and communication gadgets. Stata 12 (Stata Corp 2012) was 
used in all data analyses. 
 
Table 4. Definition of variables 
  
Variables Defining variables Variable description 
 
Household size  Two categories 
representing the number 
of people residing in a 
household 
1 = household members are </=5  
0 = household members > 5 
Sex of household head Is the household head 
male or female 
0 = male, 1 = female 
Household-head education Educational level of the 
household-head. 
1 = no formal education 
(reference) 
2 = primary  
3 = secondary 
4 = tertiary 
 
 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
Household-head employed Employment status of 
household-head 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
Children (<6years) Household has a child < 
6 years.  
1 =yes, 0 = no 
Elderly (>=60years) Household has an elderly 
aged >=60 years. 
1 =yes, 0 = no 
Socio-economic level 
presented by quintiles 
Household ranking based 
on the asset index. 
1 = poorest (reference) 
2 = second poorest 
3 = middle 
4 = second richest 
5 = richest 
Household region Household location in 
terms of region. 
1 = Hhohho (reference) 
2 = Manzini 
 
1 =yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
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3 = Shiselweni 
4 = Lubombo 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
1 = yes, 0 = no 
Household location Place of residence of 
household. 
0 = urban, 1 = rural  
Type of health-care facility 
 
Type of facility used by 
household for accessing 
health care. 
Public 
Private 
Mission 
Informal care 
 
 
1=yes, 0 = no (reference) 
1=yes, 0 = no 
1=yes, 0 = no 
1 =yes,0 = no  
 
Results  
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of some variables used in the analysis 
 
Variables                                                                                    N (%) 
 
  
Place of residence of household  
Rural  1794 (56.7%) 
Urban  1373 (43.4%) 
Total  3167 (100%) 
  
Number of households per region 
Hhohho 1015   (32.1%) 
Manzini 977     (30.9%) 
Lubombo 526     (16.6%) 
Shiselweni 649     (20.5%) 
Total  3167   (100%) 
  
Sex of household head 
Male 1737 (54.9%) 
Female 1430 (45.1%) 
Total  3167 (100%) 
 
Household head with at least tertiary education (by sex) 
Female  195 (6.2%) 
Male  365 (11.5%) 
Total 559 (17.7%) 
  
Household size by location 
>5 members 809 (25.5%) (rural) 
< = 5 members 985 (31.1%) (rural) 
>5 members 197 (6.2%)(urban) 
< = 5 members 1176 (37.1%)(urban) 
Total 3167 (100%) 
  
Employment status of household by sex  
Employed (male & female) 1983 (62.6%) 
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Female 760 (24%) 
Male 1223 (38.6%) 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 5 provides summary statistics for key variables used in the analysis. Of the 3167 
households, more than half were male headed (55 per cent) and mostly rural (57 per 
cent). Also, a large number of the households were from the Hhohho region (32 per cent) 
whilst the least (17 per cent) came from the Manzini region. In total only 18 per cent of 
household heads had attained tertiary education and of those only 6 per cent were 
female. About 32 per cent of households had a large household size (>5 members), and 
25 per cent of those households were rural. Finally, more than half of the household 
heads (63 per cent) were employed and were mostly males (39 per cent) compared to 
females (24 per cent). 
 
Table 6. Households’ catastrophic out of-pocket health expenditures indices  
  
 Total household expenditure Total non-food household 
expenditure 
Initial 
thresholds 
(z) 
5% 10% 20% 25% 5% 10% 25% 40% 
Headcount 16.8% 9.6% 3.8% 2.3% 24.1% 15.8% 5.9% 2.7% 
Gap 1.4% 0.9% 0.4% 0.2% 2.9% 2.1%% 0.87 0.36 
Mean 
positive 
gap 
8.6% 9.4% 10.5% 11.7% 12.1% 13.2% 14.6% 13.2% 
Parameter value y = 0.8. 
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Considering an initial threshold level of 10 per cent for total household expenditure, the 
catastrophic head count was 9.6 per cent. This means that on average about 9.6 per 
cent of the Swazi households pay catastrophic payments if the initial threshold is set at 
10%. In absolute terms this represents about 99,853 individuals based on an estimated 
population of about 1 million people (CSO, 2015). 
 
The catastrophic headcount varied with the initial threshold as well as the measure for 
households’ ability to pay. E.g., defining catastrophe using total and non-food 
expenditure at the 5 per cent initial threshold, about 16.8 per cent and 24.1 per cent 
households incurred catastrophic payments respectively. A similar trend was shown with 
respect to the gap measures for both expenditure measures. For total expenditure at the 
5 and 10 per cent initial thresholds, households paid out-of-pocket health payments in 
excess (overshoot) of about 1.4 and 0.9 per cent respectively over and above their rank 
dependent thresholds. Considering the initial threshold of 10 per cent for total 
expenditure, the mean positive gap was 9.4 per cent. 
 
A comparison of financial catastrophe using total and non-food household expenditures 
(Table 6) reveals important differences. E.g., on average, financial catastrophe estimates 
based on total non-food household expenditure were significantly higher than those 
based on total household expenditures.  
 
Table 7. Poverty headcounts and gap measures 
  
National poverty line (E461 per person per 
month) 
International poverty line 
($1.25/day) 
 Gross 
payme
nt  
(a) 
Net 
payme
nt 
(b) 
Absolut
e 
poverty 
(c) = 
(b)-(a)  
Relativ
e 
povert
y  
 
Gross 
payme
nt  
(a) 
 
Net   
payme
nt  
(b) 
Absolut
e 
poverty 
(c) = 
(b)-(a) 
Relativ
e 
povert
y 
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Poverty 
Headcou
nt 
62.3% 63.3% 1.1% 1.7% 20.8% 22.5% 1.6% 7.7% 
Poverty 
gap 
1662.2 1719.1 56.9 3.4% 145.1 155.9 10.8 7.4% 
Normaliz
ed gap  
30.0% 31.0% 1.0% 3.3% 6.7% 7.2% 0.5% 7.5% 
Mean 
positive 
gap 
48.3% 49.1% 0.8% 1.7% 32.2% 32.0% 0.2% 0.6% 
 
Using the national poverty line (Table 7), poverty head count increased from 62 per cent 
to 63 per cent due to out-of-pocket payments. This translates to an absolute poverty rise 
of 1.1 per cent. This represents about 11,441 individuals pushed below the poverty line. 
This percentage translates to about 1.7 per cent relative poverty increment. The poverty 
gap on the other hand increased from E1662.2 to E1719. This represents an absolute 
rise of E56.90 or about 3.4 per cent relative increment. 
 
Expressing the poverty gap as a proportion of the poverty line, the normalised poverty 
gap increased by 1.0 per cent resulting in a relative rise of 3.3 per cent. The mean 
positive poverty gap increased by 0.8 per cent representing a relative increment of 1.7 
per cent. This means that among those that are originally poor, on average, poverty was 
deepened further by about 0.8 per cent as a result of out-of-pocket health payments  
A similar pattern of increased numbers of individuals pushed below the poverty line as a 
result of out-of-pocket payments was evident with the international poverty line. 
Factors associated with households’ vulnerability to catastrophic health 
expenditure and impoverishment 
 
As shown in Tables Table 8 and Table 9, a range of variables are associated with 
households’ vulnerability to financial risk. Households with an employed head were about 
2 times less likely to experience financial catastrophe (p<0.01) while the likelihood for 
impoverishment was 1.3 times less. However, for impoverishment this was statistically 
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insignificant at the 5 per cent level. Using private care increased the likelihood of 
catastrophe by 7.5 times more compared to public care (p<0.01), but it was protective 
against impoverishment (p<0.05). Also, belonging to any income quintile other than the 
poorest was protective against both catastrophe and impoverishment at the 1 per cent 
level of significance (Table 8 and Table 9). 
 
Other significant predictors (p<0.01; Table 8) for catastrophe, included belonging to the 
Lubombo region, history of informal care and using mission facilities. For impoverishment 
(p<0.01; Table 9), rural households were 2 times more likely to get impoverished from 
out-of-pocket payment than urban households (p<0.01). Other positive predictors for 
impoverishment included having children (5 years or less) (p<0.01) and elderly (60 and 
above) (p<0.05) in the household. An educated household-head (with tertiary education) 
decreased the household’s likelihood for experiencing impoverishment. As can be seen 
from both tables (8 and 9) there were other variables that could predicted financial risk 
but were statistically insignificant, e.g., household-head sex. 
 
Further, as shown in Appendix 1. Table 10 and Appendix 2. Table 11, similar analysis was 
also conducted using the total non-food expenditure (for financial catastrophe) and the 
international poverty line (for impoverishment). There were notable differences and 
similarities in the results. E.g., belonging to the lowest socio economic quintile continued 
to increase the likelihood for financial risk in all the models (see Tables 8, 9, 10, and 11), 
while only for the international poverty line did female-headed household emerged as a 
predictor for impoverishment (p<0.05). 
 
Table 8. Factors associated with catastrophic health expenditure, total 
expenditure (SHIES 2009/10) 
 
 
Factors                                                           Odds Ratio                                                                 SE 
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HH-head employed 0.54*** 0.10 
Sex of HH-head (female 
vs male) 
0.84 0.14 
Children 1.04 0.08 
Elderly 1.10 0.14 
Education level of HH-education (reference No formal education) 
Primary 1.11 0.25 
Secondary 1.20 0.36 
Tertiary 1.51 0.69 
Socio-economic status (reference poorest) 
Second poorest  0.82 0.21 
Middle  0.44*** 0.12 
Second richest 0.55* 0.19 
Richest 0.38*** 0.13 
Households regions (reference Hhohho)  
Manzini 1.47* 0.31 
Shiselweni 0.83 0.20 
Lubombo 2.20*** 0.44 
Type of health care facility (reference public) 
Private 7.53*** 1.44 
Mission 4.18*** 1.02 
Informal care 11.30 3.60 
Location (rural vs urban) 0.87 0.19 
HH-size (less than 5 vs 
greater than 5) 
1.22 0.22 
Note: Level of significance in asterisks 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.1  
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Table 9. Factors associated with impoverishment, using national PL (SHIES 
2009/10) 
Note: Level of significance in asterisks 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.1  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Factors                                                              Odds Ratio                                                          S 
HH-head employed   0.78 0.11 
Sex of HH-head (female 
vs male) 
0.91 0.91 
Children     1.49*** 0.11 
Elderly   1.40** 0.19 
Education level of HH-education (reference No formal education) 
Primary  1.05 0.21 
Secondary 0.76 0.15 
Tertiary      0.19*** 0.07 
Socio-economic status 
(reference poorest  ) 
  
Second poorest        0.41*** 0.09 
Middle      0.24*** 0.05 
Second richest       0.09*** 0.02 
Richest       0.03*** 0.01 
Households regions (reference Hhohho) 
Manzini 1.14 0.20 
Shiselweni 0.72 0.15 
Lubombo 1.11 0.24 
Type of health care facility (Public reference ) 
Private    0.63** 0.13 
Mission 1.04 0.30 
Informal care  0.88 0 .32 
Location (rural vs urban)      2.09*** 0.31 
HH-size (less than 5 vs 
greater than 5) 
     0.37*** 0.06 
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Discussion 
 
This study sets out with the aim of assessing financial health protection in Swaziland. 
The results suggest inadequate financial health protection in Swaziland’s health 
systems, even though the country records a modest share of out-of-pocket health 
payments in total health expenditure. This is in relation to the minimum accepted levels 
of 15-20 per cent noted by Word Health Organization (WHO, 2015b). A considerable 
percentage of households experienced catastrophic health expenditures at all the 
threshold levels considered. However, the severity significantly decreases with higher 
threshold levels. Based on previous studies, this may suggest that the burden is heavy 
among poor households and this has worrying implications on the consumption of 
essential non-medical necessities for the poor. This is the case as poor households 
allocate a greater share of their budget to food (O'Donnell et al., 2008; Su, Kouyaté & 
Flessa, 2006). A similar pattern of findings has been reported from other developing 
countries (Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015; Saksena, Xu & Durairaj, 2010). 
 
In this paper it was estimated that about 1.1 per cent of households (e.g., about 11,441 
Swazis) were pushed below the poverty line as a result of out-of-pocket health payments. 
The findings were comparable to those of other low-income countries in Africa (Mills et 
al., 2012; Chuma & Maina, 2012). Although this percentage is small, it represents a 
significant population given the high national poverty rate estimated at 63 per cent (CSO, 
2015). Furthermore, using the national poverty line, the mean positive poverty gap was 
17 per cent. This means that the increase in poverty caused by out-of-pocket payments 
was mainly as a result of the previously non-poor households being pushed below the 
poverty line rather than deepening of poverty for the previously poor households. This 
shows that the adverse consequence of out-of-pocket health payments occurs across 
households of different socio-economic status. Similar results have been observed in 
114 
 
earlier studies conducted in other developing countries (Ilunga-Iunga et al., 2015; 
Akinkugbe, Chama-Chiliba & Tlotlego*, 2012; Ekman, 2007). 
 
While these results are similar in pattern to those of other studies, they may understate 
the extent of financial catastrophe and impoverishment in Swaziland. This is because of 
the high national poverty rate and the fact that the country is still placing charges on 
health care services even at public facilities. Based on literature from elsewhere, in this 
circumstance the poor may be underutilising health care services as they may not afford 
payment. They may also modify their perception of illness (McIntyre et al., 2006). This 
has more devastating consequences to households’ welfare (Whitehead, Dahlgren & 
Evans, 2001). A similar finding emerged in a cross-country study that included Swaziland 
(Leive & Xu, 2008). However, it is important to note that this study was assessing 
households’ coping mechanisms and not financial catastrophe or impoverishment per 
se. 
 
A wide range of household characteristics were associated with households’ vulnerability 
to financial risks. Belonging to the poorest quintile was strongly associated with 
households’ likelihood of incurring both financial catastrophe and impoverishment 
compared to other quintiles. This finding corroborates those by previous studies, which 
showed that the burden of health care payment was disproportionally more for poor 
households than their better-off counterparts (Onwujekwe, Hanson & Uzochukwu, 2012; 
Xu et al., 2003). An unemployed household-head was another predictor of financial risk 
while being educated (tertiary level) provides a protective effect against impoverishment 
only. 
 
As expected, private health care utilisation increases the likelihood of financial 
catastrophe, but surprisingly it was protective against impoverishment. Even though 
literature on factors associated with impoverishment was limited, majority of previous 
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studies point out private care as associated with financial catastrophe (Saksena, Xu & 
Durairaj, 2010; Xu et al., 2006). However, the possible explanation for these results could 
be that private facilities are mostly utilised by the better-off groups who can afford 
payment or any form of health insurance (Ataguba & McIntyre, 2013). While these 
households pay for health care out-of-pocket, which may be financially catastrophic, 
such payments are not sufficient to impoverish them. Thus, the consequences of out-of-
pocket payments may be less for the well-off since they have enough resources e.g., 
savings compared to poor households (Ataguba & McIntyre, 2013). While on the other 
hand, the poor are faced with health payments in every facility when there is no coverage 
by a third party (Mathauer et al., 2008). 
 
This explanation seems to be supported further by findings in this study as it was 
indicated that the utilisation of any form of health care facility other than public is highly 
predictive of financial catastrophe. Furthermore, these findings were in accord with most 
studies investigating financial health protection particularly from low-income countries 
(Kwesiga, Zikusooka & Ataguba, 2015; Ukwaja et al., 2013). On the other hand, these 
results indicate that perhaps public charges are the least compared to those by other 
facilities in Swaziland. 
 
As expected, smaller household size (5 members or less) was protective against 
impoverishment, and similar findings were shown elsewhere (Brinda, Rodriguez & 
Enemark, 2014; Knaul et al., 2011). Another important finding from the study concerns 
the elderly and children. Households living with children (5 year or less) or the elderly 
(60 and above) are at higher risk for impoverishment and financial catastrophe (using 
non-food expenditure). This is not surprising because the demand for health care 
increases with age (Grossman, 2000). 
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Being a rural resident was shown to be associated with impoverishment. E.g., the most 
rural and poorest region (Lubombo) was found to be associated with both financial 
catastrophe and impoverishment (CSO, 2011). These findings are similar to those 
reported elsewhere (Abu-Zaineh et al., 2013; Knaul et al., 2011). Perhaps rural residency 
is associated with lower financial capacity and higher probability of ill-health. These two 
effects mean that rural residents will face a comparatively higher burden of out-of-pocket 
payments. 
 
What is worth noting, is that when comparing the findings for the total and total non-food 
expenditure (e.g., for financial catastrophe) as well as those for the national and 
international poverty lines (e.g., for impoverishment) there were slight differences. E.g., 
sex of the household-head predicted impoverishment only for the international poverty 
line. This seems to suggest that factors that increase households’ vulnerability to 
financial risk may vary with the measure of households’ welfare and the measure of 
financial risk protection. 
 
The lack of financial protection in Swaziland as indicated by the results is a cause of 
concern. This is because it may have adverse consequences on households. There is 
therefore an urgent need for the country to institute financial risk protection measures to 
protect households from financial risk, particularly the poor. An example is the use of 
mandatory prepayment mechanisms that have been recommended by the WHO 
(McIntyre, 2007) and which have been demonstrated as effective in bringing down the 
levels of financial risk even in low income countries (McIntyre & Meheus, 2013; Saksena 
et al., 2011; Nguyen, Rajkotia & Wang, 2011).  
 
The study findings do not only add to the growing body of literature but they also enhance 
better understanding of the financial health protection status in Swaziland. It serves as a 
base for future related studies to be conducted in the country. In addition, policy makers 
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can use the findings demonstrated in this study to better target interventions at those 
households at risk as shown by this study. Additionally, the study findings could serve 
as an advocacy tool to politicians for the need to address the lack of financial protection. 
Further, it has the potential to place financial health protection on top of the Ministry of 
Health’s agenda as it has demonstrated critical, relevant and limited evidence in the 
country. 
 
A key strength of the study is that financial catastrophe was assessed using variable 
thresholds other than the conventional uniform threshold used by most previous studies. 
This methodology has the advantage of explicitly recognising diminishing marginal utility 
of income and incorporates the principle of vertical equity, which is fundamental in the 
assessment of fairness in health financing system. Importantly, studies using the variable 
threshold approach have reported higher estimates compared to those obtained with the 
uniformed threshold (Ataguba, 2012); signifying an understatement of financial 
catastrophe. 
 
Limitations 
 
One of the limitations of the study lies in the fact that the methodology employed does 
not consider those who need services but could not afford. Evidence suggests greater 
welfare loss among these households compared to those incurring catastrophic 
payments (Wagstaff et al., 2011). Thus, the estimates reported in this study could be 
underestimated for that reason. Also, the potential limitations inherited in the use of 
cross-sectional survey data such as recall bias cannot be disregarded.  
 
On the other hand, findings from the study point to the need to explore factors that 
increase households’ vulnerability to financial risk beyond household-level 
characteristics. E.g., informal health care utilisation was indicated as increasing the 
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likelihood of financial catastrophe way more than the use of other health facilities (private, 
mission and public). It would therefore be worthwhile to explore, within the context of 
Swaziland, the possible reasons why households use different types of health facilities 
and how that impact on financial risk protection in order to better inform interventions in 
future.  
 
Conclusion  
 
The study findings demonstrated that financial health protection is inadequate in 
Swaziland even though out-of-pocket payments comprise a small share (<15%) of total 
health finance in the country. It emerged that about 9.6 per cent households incurred 
financial catastrophe while about 1.1 per cent were impoverished by paying out-of-pocket 
for health care. Considering the factors that have been identified to increase households’ 
vulnerability to both financial catastrophe and impoverishment, there is, therefore, a need 
for the country to devise a strategy to prevent and protect such households from financial 
risk. A reasonable approach to address this problem include targeting interventions at 
those at risk (e.g., through effective exemption mechanisms). Importantly, the country 
should rely more on health financing mechanisms that do not impose undue hardships 
on the poor and vulnerable. 
 
Footnotes 
 
1. The ability of the health systems to protects its population against financial risk as a result of direct 
health expenditures. 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
References 
 
Abu-Zaineh, Mohammad, Habiba Ben Romdhane, Bruno Ventelou, Jean-Paul Moatti, 
and Arfa Chokri. 2013. Appraising financial protection in health: The case of 
Tunisia. International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics 13 (1) (03): 
73-93. 
Akinkugbe, Oluyele, Chitalu Chama-Chiliba, and Naomi Tlotlego. 2012. Health 
financing and catastrophic payments for health care: Evidence from household-
level survey data in Botswana and Lesotho. African Development Review 24 (4) 
(12): 358-70. 
Ataguba, John Ele-Ojo. 2012. Reassessing catastrophic health-care payments with a 
Nigerian case study. Health Economics, Policy and Law 7 (03): 309-26. 
Ataguba, John E., and Di McIntyre. 2012. Paying for and receiving benefits from health 
services in South Africa: Is the health system equitable? Health Policy and 
Planning 27 (MAR): i35-45. 
Ataguba, John Ele-Ojo, and Di McIntyre. 2013. Who benefits from health services in 
South Africa? Health Economics, Policy and Law 8 (01): 21-46. 
Barros, Aluisio J. D., Joao Luiz Bastos, and Andrea H. Damaso. 2011. Catastrophic 
spending on health care in Brazil: Private health insurance does not seem to be 
the solution. Cadernos De Saude Publica 27:S254-62. 
Brearly, L., R. Marten, and T. O’Connell. 2013. Universal health coverage: A 
commitment to close the gap. New York: Rockefeller Foundation, Save the 
Children, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health 
Organization. 
120 
 
Brinda, Ethel Mary, Andrés Antonio Rodriguez, and Ulrika Enemark. 2014. Correlates 
of out-of-pocket and catastrophic health expenditures in Tanzania: Results from a 
national household survey. BMC International Health & Human Rights 14 (1) (03): 
1-15. 
Chuma, Jane, and Thomas Maina. 2012. Catastrophic health care spending and 
impoverishment in Kenya. BMC Health Services Research 12 (3) (03/15): 1-9. 
CSO. Central statistical office of Swaziland. 2015 Available from 
http://www.swazistats.org.sz/ (accessed 2015,July,16). 
CSO. 2011. Poverty in a decade of slow economic growth: Swaziland in the 2000’s. 
Swaziland: Central Statistical Office, . 
Ekman, Björn. 2007. Catastrophic health payments and health insurance: Some 
counterintuitive evidence from one low-income country. Health Policy 83 (2–3) 
(10): 304-13. 
Flores, Gabriela, Jaya Krishnakumar, Owen O'Donnell, and Eddy Van Doorslaer. 2008. 
Coping with health-care costs: Implications for the measurement of catastrophic 
expenditures and poverty. Health Economics 17 (12) (DEC): 1393-412. 
Grossman, Michael. 2000. The human capital model. Handbook of Health Economics 1 
: 347-408. 
Ilunga-Iunga, Felicien, Alain Leveque, Samia Laokri, and Michele Dramaix. 2015. 
Incidence of catastrophic health expenditures for households: An example of 
medical attention for the treatment of severe childhood malaria in Kinshasa 
reference hospitals, Democratic Republic of Congo. Journal of Infection and Public 
Health 8 (2) (MAR-APR): 136-44. 
121 
 
Knaul, Felicia Marie, Héctor Arreola-Ornelas, Oscar Méndez-Carniado, and Ana 
Cristina Torres. 2007. Impoverishing and catastrophic household health spending 
among families with older adults in Mexico: A health reform priority. In The health 
of aging Hispanics, 237-262Springer. 
Knaul, Felicia,Marie, Rebeca Wong, Hector Arreola-Ornelas, Oscar Mendez, and 
Network Health Financing Social. 2011. Household catastrophic health 
expenditures: A comparative analysis of twelve Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. Salud Publica De Mexico 53 : S85-95. 
Kwesiga, Brendan, Charlotte M. Zikusooka, and John E. Ataguba. 2015. Assessing 
catastrophic and impoverishing effects of health care payments in Uganda. BMC 
Health Services Research 15 (1): 30. 
Leive, Adam, and Ke Xu. 2008. Coping with out-of-pocket health payments: Empirical 
evidence from 15 African countries. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 86 
(11): 849-856C. 
Mathauer, I., L. Musango, G. Carrin, and K. Mthethwa. 2008. Feasibility assessment 
and financial projection results for a social health insurance scheme in Swaziland. 
Geneva: World Health Organisation. 
McIntyre, D., and F. Meheus. 2014. Fiscal space for domestic funding of health and 
other social services. London: Chatham House, (accessed 2014, November 18). 
McIntyre, Diane. 2007. Learning from experience: Health care financing in low-and 
middle-income countries. Geneva, Switzerland: Global forum for health research 
Geneva. 
122 
 
McIntyre, D., and F. Meheus. 2013. Achieving sustainable universal health coverage in 
low- and middle-income countries. Health Economics, Policy, and Law 8 (4) (Oct): 
543-8. 
McIntyre, Diane, Michael Thiede, Göran Dahlgren, and Margaret Whitehead. 2006. 
What are the economic consequences for households of illness and of paying for 
health care in low- and middle-income country contexts? Social Science & 
Medicine 62 (4) (2): 858-65. 
Mills, Anne, John E. Ataguba, James Akazili, Jo Borghi, Bertha Garshong, Suzan 
Makawia, Gemini Mtei, et al. 2012. Equity in financing and use of health care in 
Ghana, South Africa, and Tanzania: Implications for paths to universal coverage. 
The Lancet 380 (9837) (7/14–20): 126-33. 
Nguyen, Ha T. H., Yogesh Rajkotia, and Hong Wang. 2011. The financial protection 
effect of Ghana national health insurance scheme: Evidence from a study in two 
rural districts. International Journal for Equity in Health 10 (JAN 19 2011): 4. 
O'Donnell, Owen, Adam Wagstaff, Eddy van Doorslaer, and M. Lindelow. 2008. 
Analyzing health equity using household survey data: A guide to techniques and 
their implementation. Washington DC: World Bank Publications. 
Onwujekwe, Obinna, Kara Hanson, and Benjamin Uzochukwu. 2012. Examining 
inequities in incidence of catastrophic health expenditures on different healthcare 
services and health facilities in Nigeria. Plos One 7 (7) (JUL 16): e40811. 
Saksena, Priyanka, Ke Xu, and Varatharajan Durairaj. 2010. The drivers of 
catastrophic expenditure: Outpatient services, hospitalization or medicines. 
Geneva: World Health Organization, 21. 
123 
 
Saksena, Priyanka, Adelio Fernandes Antunes, Ke Xu, Laurent Musango, and Guy 
Carrin. 2011. Mutual health insurance in Rwanda: Evidence on access to care and 
financial risk protection. Health Policy 99 (3) (MAR 2011): 203-9. 
Sambo, Luis Gomes, and Joses Muthuri Kirigia. 2014. Investing in health systems for 
universal health coverage in Africa. BMC International Health and Human Rights 
14 (OCT 28): 28. 
Sambo, Luis Gomes, Joses Muthuri Kirigia, and Juliet Nabyonga Orem. 2013. Health 
financing in the African region: 2000-2009 data analysis. International Archives of 
Medicine 6 (1) (2013): 10. 
Séne, Ligane Massamba, and Momath Cissé. 2015. Catastrophic out-of-pocket 
payments for health and poverty nexus: Evidence from Senegal. International 
Journal of Health Economics and Management: 1-22. 
Su, Tin Tin, Bocar Kouyaté, and Steffen Flessa. 2006. Catastrophic household 
expenditure for health care in a low-income society: A study from Nouna district, 
Burkina Faso. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 84 (1): 21-7. 
Ukwaja, Kingsley Nnanna, Isaac Alobu, Seye Abimbola, and Philip Christy Hopewell. 
2013. Household catastrophic payments for tuberculosis care in Nigeria: 
Incidence, determinants, and policy implications for universal health coverage. 
Infecteous Disease of Poverty 2 (1): 21. 
Van Minh, Hoang, Nguyen Thi Kim Phuong, Priyanka Saksena, Chris D. James, and 
Ke Xu. 2013. Financial burden of household out-of-pocket health expenditure in 
Vietnam: Findings from the national living standard survey 2002–2010. Social 
Science & Medicine 96 (0) (11): 258-63. 
124 
 
Wagstaff, Adam. 2002. Poverty and health sector inequalities. Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization 80 (2): 97-105. 
Wagstaff, Adam, Marcel Bilger, Zurab Sajaia, and Michael Lokshin. 2011. Health 
protection and financial protection. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. 
Wagstaff, Adam, and Eddy van Doorslaer. 2003. Catastrophe and impoverishment in 
paying for health care: With applications to Vietnam 1993–1998. Health 
Economics 12 (11): 921-33. 
Whitehead, Margaret, Göran Dahlgren, and Timothy Evans. 2001. Equity and health 
sector reforms: Can low-income countries escape the medical poverty trap? The 
Lancet 358 (9284) (9/8): 833-6. 
WHO. 2015. National health accounts database. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health 
Organisation. 
WHO. 2013. State of health financing in the  African region. Brazzaville, Congo: World 
Health Organization regional office for Africa. 
WHO. 2010. The world health report. Health system financing. The path to universal 
health. Geneva: WHO Press. 
World Bank. 2008. Global purchasing power parities and real expenditures; 2005 
international comparison program. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Xu, Ke, David B. Evans, Patrick Kadama, Juliet Nabyonga, Peter Ogwang Ogwal, 
Pamela Nabukhonzo, and Ana Mylena Aguilar. 2006. Understanding the impact of 
eliminating user fees: Utilization and catastrophic health expenditures in Uganda. 
Social Science & Medicine 62 (4): 866-76. 
125 
 
Xu, K., DB Evans, K. Kawabata, R. Zeramdini, J. Klavus, and CJL Murray. 2003. 
Household catastrophic health expenditure: A multicountry analysis. Lancet 362 
(9378) (JUL 12): 111-7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126 
 
4 Part D: Policy brief 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
127 
 
POLICY BRIEF 
 
The adverse effects on households paying out-of-pocket for health care in 
Swaziland 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Highlights 
 About 9.6% (99,853) of Swazi households spend more than 10% of their total 
expenditure paying out-of-pocket for health care. 
 11,441 individuals face financial hardship as a result of paying out-of-pocket for 
health care. 
 The adverse consequences for paying out-of-pocket for health are severe 
among poor households compared to better-off households. 
 Use of health facilities other than public facilities increases households’ 
vulnerability for suffering financial risk. Thus, there is an urgent need for 
concerted efforts and strategies aimed at protecting households from the 
adverse effects of paying out-of-pocket for health care. 
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Introduction 
 
Swaziland is among countries that has committed toward achieving the ambitious goal 
of Universal Health Coverage by 2025 (WHO, 2015a). Universal Health Coverage is 
defined as ensuring that all people obtain the health services they need, which should 
be of good quality without suffering financial hardship when paying for them (McIntyre, 
2007). Health financing is an important element of the broader effort toward attaining 
universal health coverage, and out-of-pocket payment is one of the mechanisms of 
health financing. However, the World Health Organization calls on countries to move 
away from relying on this form of health care financing to prepayment mechanisms, that 
is, contributing to health care before the need to use health care services arises.  
 
Out-of-pocket health care payments have implications for access to and utilization of 
health services particularly among the poor. This is because out-of-pocket health 
financing places emphasis on service provision on condition that individuals can afford 
payments, yet the poor who tend to need more health care services cannot afford such 
payments. Those who may manage to pay usually forgo spending on basic needs (e.g., 
food and shelter) and consequently incur financial catastrophe14. In addition to 
catastrophe, poor households can become poorer while the non-poor run the risk of 
being impoverished (getting into poverty15) as a result of such payments. In many cases, 
households never recover from the catastrophic and impoverishing effects of paying out-
of-pocket for health care. 
 
To mitigate the adverse consequences of out-of-pocket health care payments some 
households may resolve to not seeking health care services at all or sell productive 
assets to afford payment. However, these actions are associated with greater adverse 
effects on households’ welfare compared to those who incurred catastrophe (Su, 
Kouyaté & Flessa, 2006).  
 
                                                          
 
 
14 Health payments exceed a certain fraction of the household’s resources such that spending on other 
basic needs, e.g., food and shelter can no longer be affordable. 
15 Poverty is defined as deprivation of wellbeing and lack of command over basic commodities like food 
and water. 
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It is estimated that about 11% of total health expenditure in Swaziland is out-of-pocket 
payments. All facilities (private, public and mission) in the country still charge for service 
provision, however the costs vary with the type of facility used. This suggests that the 
potential exists for households to suffer the adverse consequences associated with 
paying for health care out-of-pocket. To further exacerbate issues, the country still lacks 
a mandatory prepayment mechanism. Prepayment mechanisms, do not only offer 
households greater protection against the adverse consequences of paying out-of-
pocket for health services, but they are also considered as the most practical means for 
countries to move toward achieving universal health coverage (WHO, 2015).  
 
Using data from the Swaziland Household Income and Expenditure Survey (SHIES) 
2009/2010, this study investigates the level to which paying for health care out-of-pocket 
adversely affects households in Swaziland. In addition, the study investigates factors 
that increase households’ vulnerability to these adverse effects. The major adverse 
effects are impoverishment and financial catastrophe from paying out-of-pocket for 
health services. 
 
Findings 
 
Households incurring financial 
catastrophe 
In 2009/2010 about 9.6% of Swazi 
households experienced financial 
catastrophic health expenditure. This 
means that these households spend in 
excess of 10% of their total consumption 
expenditure paying out-of-pocket for 
health care. This represents over 99,000 
Swazis being deprived of the opportunity 
to be able to meet basic needs.  
Figure 3, indicates a proportion of households 
spending more than 10% of their total consumption 
expenditure paying out-of-pocket for health care and 
proportion of those who got impoverished by such 
payments. 
Figure 3. The effects of paying for 
health care out-of-pocket. 
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Impoverishment effects of out-of-pocket payments 
 
Although about 62% of the Swazi population is poor, paying for health care out-of-pocket 
puts an additional 1.1% of the population into poverty in the country (see figure 3). This 
represents over 11,000 Swazis. This population were non-poor before paying for health 
care. If they had not financed health care out-of-pocket, they will not become poor. Also, 
a substantial number of Swazi population who were previously poor became even poorer 
as a result of such payments. 
 
 
 
Which households are likely to incur financial risk as a result of out-of-pocket payments? 
 
Many factors are associated with households’ vulnerability to financial risk in Swaziland. 
Households that use private facilities, informal care, and mission facilities are at risk. This 
is especially the case for the use of informal care. Also, households living with children 
(5 years or less) or elderly (60 years or above) are more likely to incur financial risks. 
Such vulnerability varies by region of residence. Living in Lubombo increases this risk 
compared to living in Hhohho, Manzini and Shiselweni regions. The results of the 
Shiselweni region, one of the poorest in the country, may signify that households in that 
region are not utilising health care services and as such not incurring any costs. 
 
On the other hand, households with an educated and employed household heads are 
less likely to incur financial risk. Similarly, a small household size (5 or less members) is 
protective against incurring financial risk. 
 
Policy recommendations 
 
Direct out-of-pocket payments do not only disrupt households’ welfare but also serve as 
a stumbling block toward the country achieving universal coverage. Therefore, there is 
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a need for concerted efforts to address the adverse consequences of paying out-of-
pocket for health care highlighted by the study findings. Financial catastrophe is directly 
linked to direct out-of-pocket payments. Thus, if households are to be protected from the 
adverse effects of paying out-of-pocket for health care, efforts should be directed toward 
the following measures; 
 Implementing financial risk protection strategies targeting the most at risk 
households to catastrophe. Such strategies may include exemption mechanisms. 
The strategies should be guided by clear and practical operational steps if 
maximum potential gains are to be realized. 
 
 Minimizing direct payment at the point of care considerably by ensuring that 
access to essential health care services is not dependent on ability to pay. This 
can be achieved by adopting mandatory prepayment mechanisms such as 
National Health Insurance 
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Disclaimer: The photographs used in this policy brief are for illustrative purposes 
only and they are publicly available.  
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5.1 Appendix 1. Table 10. Factors associated with catastrophic health 
expenditure, total non-food expenditure (SHIES 2009/10) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Factors                                                                          Odds Ratio                                    SE 
HH-head employed    0.54** 0.13 
Sex of HH-head (female vs male) 0.73  0 .18   
Children 1.06 0.11 
Elderly 1.33 0.25 
Education level of HH-education (reference no formal education) 
Primary  1.11 0.52 
Secondary    0.33**   0.87 
Tertiary 3.82 4.71 
Socio-economic status (reference poorest) 
Second poorest   0.78 0.26 
Middle     0.33*** 0.12 
Second richest   0.32* 0.21 
Richest     0.06*** 0.06 
Households regions (reference Hhohho) 
Manzini 1.08 0.42 
Shiselweni 0.69 0.30   
Lubombo     2.66*** 0.87   
Type of health care facility  (reference public) 
Private    3.87*** 1.40 
Mission    4.65*** 1.90 
Informal care     9.80*** 4.47 
Location (rural vs urban)                    1.38 0.49 
HH-size (less than 5 vs greater than 5)                    1.57 0.50 
Note: Level of significance in asterisks 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.1  
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5.2 Appendix 2. Table 11, Factors associated with impoverishment, using 
International PL (SHIES 2009/10) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Factors                                                                         Odds Ratio                                   SE 
HH-head employed   0.74* 0.12 
Sex of HH-head (female vs male)    1.38** 0.22 
Children  1.13* 0.07 
Elderly 1.01 0.12 
Socio-economic status (reference poorest  ) 
Second poorest       0.44*** 0.08 
Middle     0.20*** 0.05 
Second richest      0.09*** 0.03 
Richest      0.01*** 0.01 
Households regions (reference Hhohho) 
Manzini 1.19 0.32 
Shiselweni 0.65 0.19 
Lubombo 1.22 0.36 
Type of health care facility  (reference public) 
Private    0.60** 0.14 
Mission 0.68 0.18 
Informal care  0.37 0.24 
Location (rural vs urban)    3.58*** 0.96 
HH-size (less than 5 vs greater than 5)    0.30*** 0.05 
Note: Level of significance in asterisks 
***p<0.01,    **p<0.05,    *p<0.1  
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5.3 Appendix 3. Principal Component Analysis  
 
This sections aims to offer a description of the principal component analysis (PCA) 
method used in the study to construct the socio-economic status (SES) indices. A 
detailed explanation on the technique can be found in (Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006).  
 
PCA is a multivariate statistical technique that reduces the number of variables in a data 
set into a smaller number of dimensions to obtain a linear combination of original 
variables that explains the variability in the original variables. The subsets of the original 
variables are coherent and they are called principal components. The weight for each 
principal component is given by eigenvectors16 while the variance is given by 
eigenvalues17 of the corresponding eigenvector of a correlation or covariance matrix of 
the given variables. The first principal component (PC1) explains the largest possible 
amount of variation in the original data. Successive components are uncorrelated to the 
previous component thus explaining a completely different dimension of the data. This 
means that even smaller proportion of the variation in the original variables is explained 
hence, the common application of this technique among other reasons. 
 
The correlation matrix of the set of variables reflected by each principal component can 
be illustrated as below. 
Given a set of variables  𝑋1, . . , 𝑋𝑛 
 
PC1 =  𝑎11𝑋1 +  𝑎12𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝑎1𝑛𝑋𝑛  
 
PC𝑚 =  𝑎𝑚1𝑋1 +  𝑎𝑚2𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑚𝑛𝑋𝑛  
 
                                                          
 
 
16 Eigenvectors are set of functions (coefficients) that describe data variability.  
17 Eigenvalues is a measure of data variability in in a correlation or covariance matrix of given random 
variables  
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where 𝑎𝑚𝑛 represents the weight for the 𝑚th principal component and the  𝑛th variable. 
The asset index, 𝐴𝑖 , for individual 𝑖 is defined below as follows: (method adapted from 
O'Donnell et al., (2008)). 
𝐴𝑖 = ∑ [𝑓𝑘
(𝑎𝑖𝑘− 𝑎𝑘)
𝑆𝑘
]
𝑘
 
Where: 
–𝑎𝑖𝑘 is the value of asset 𝑘 to household 𝑖 
–𝑎𝑘 is the sample mean 
– 𝑆𝑘is the sample standard deviation 
–𝑓𝑘 are the weights associated with the first principal component 
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5.4 Appendix 5. Logistic regression model 
 
This is a statistical method used to predict the odds of an event occurring based on the 
values of the predictor variables. Thus if 𝜋(𝑥) is a probability of an event occurring at 
household 𝑖 with household characteristics 𝑥, then the odds ratio (OR) is given as; 
𝑂𝑅 =  
𝜋(𝑥)
(1 − 𝜋(𝑥))
 
𝑂𝑅 = 0 if 𝜋(𝑥) = 0 and 𝑂𝑅 = ∞ if 𝜋(𝑥) = 1 
 
In this study if OR > 1 then the factor or variable being considered indicates households 
vulnerability to financial risk while if OR < 1 indicated less likelihood (protection against 
the households vulnerability to financial risk). 
If 𝑋𝑖 represent the control variables in the model and 𝛽 represent the constant 
parameters (coefficients), therefore applying a logit transformation to the linear 
probability model (LPM18) the model shall be obtained as  
 
𝐼𝑛 [
𝜋(𝑥)
1 − 𝜋(𝑥)
] = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜒1 + 𝛽2𝜒2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑖𝜒𝑖 
 
where 𝜋(𝑥) is the probability that the response variable (catastrophic payment or 
impoverishment) 𝑌𝑖 = 1; 𝛼 is the constant and 𝛽 are the coefficient of the predictor 
variables 𝑋𝑖 used in the regression. (The logistic model was adapted from (O'Donnell et 
al., 2008)). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
18 LMP is similar to linear regression model but the dependent variable is binary. 
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5.7 Appendix 8: Swaziland Household Income Expenditure Survey 
Questionnaire (2009/2010) 
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